F
Filter
Guest
Ìgy minden ok.
Semmi védelmi pénz....
Környezetvédelem.
Az IC-k is csak szellőztetik a várost éjjel....nincs pihi?
Ugyan már.
[BIZTPOL] Nyugat-Európa és Észak-Európa (Európai Unió)
- Téma indítója Tcat
- Indítva
-
Ha nem vagy kibékülve az alapértelmezettnek beállított sötét sablonnal, akkor a korábbi ígéretnek megfelelően bármikor átválthatsz a korábbi világos színekkel dolgozó kinézetre.
Ehhez görgess a lap aljára és a baloldalon keresd a HTKA Dark feliratú gombot. Kattints rá, majd a megnyíló ablakban válaszd a HTKA Light lehetőséget. Választásod a böngésződ elmenti cookie-ba, így amikor legközelebb érkezel ezt a műveletsort nem kell megismételned. -
Az elmúlt időszak tapasztalatai alapján házirendet kapott a topic.
Ezen témában - a fórumon rendhagyó módon - az oldal üzemeltetője saját álláspontja, meggyőződése alapján nem enged bizonyos véleményeket, mivel meglátása szerint az káros a járványhelyzet enyhítését célzó törekvésekre.
Kérünk, hogy a vírus veszélyességét kétségbe vonó, oltásellenes véleményed más platformon fejtsd ki. Nálunk ennek nincs helye. Az ilyen hozzászólásokért 1 alkalommal figyelmeztetés jár, majd folytatása esetén a témáról letiltás. Arra is kérünk, hogy a fórum más témáiba ne vigyétek át, mert azért viszont már a fórum egészéről letiltás járhat hosszabb-rövidebb időre.
-
Az elmúlt időszak tapasztalatai alapján frissített házirendet kapott a topic.
--- VÁLTOZÁS A MODERÁLÁSBAN ---
A források, hírek preferáltak. Azoknak, akik veszik a fáradságot és összegyűjtik ezeket a főként harcokkal, a háború jelenlegi állásával és haditechnika szempontjából érdekes híreket, (mindegy milyen oldali) forrásokkal alátámasztják és bonuszként legalább a címet egy google fordítóba berakják, azoknak ismételten köszönjük az áldozatos munkáját és további kitartást kívánunk nekik!
Ami nem a topik témájába vág vagy akár csak erősebb hangnemben is kerül megfogalmazásra, az valamilyen formában szankcionálva lesz
Minden olyan hozzászólásért ami nem hír, vagy szorosan a konfliktushoz kapcsolódó vélemény / elemzés azért instant 3 nap topic letiltás jár. Aki pedig ezzel trükközne és folytatná másik topicban annak 2 hónap fórum ban a jussa.
Semmi védelmi pénz....
Környezetvédelem.
Az IC-k is csak szellőztetik a várost éjjel....nincs pihi?
Ugyan már.
F
Filter
Guest
Nem tekinthetem meg.
Nem szabad.
Azaz: Ha önként öngyilkos lesz az EU, akkor USA-nak már nem kell vámokkal megfojtania.Lagarde ötlete: ha Európa még több cseppfolyósított gázt és fegyvert vásárol Amerikától, megúszhatja Trump vámjait
Nagy koponya.
Hát ami azt illeti,nem a zUSA az EU ellensége,hanem a Ződpolitikusok.....Semmi szükség rá,hogy az USA,muszka,kinaiak,Sith lovagjai bármit is tegyenek az EU pusztulásáért,megteszik azt helyettük az EU ződpolitikusok.
A német szövetségi ügyészség pénteken kémkedés miatt emelt vádat egy 57 éves török állampolgárral szemben
Ne másnak ajánlgasd! Tedd ide!
Mert a frázisok nem hiányoznak nálad, de az ellenőrizhető tények azok igencsak.
Ellenőriztem, és te tévedsz! Várom a tényekkel alátámasztott cáfolatodat!
Balti kábeles elemzés/összefoglalás:
Written by Tom Sharpe who was a Royal Navy officer for 27 years and captained four different warships
Two weekends ago data cables in the Baltic Sea – one between Sweden and Lithuania, the other Finland and Germany – were severed.
At the same time, ever vigilant maritime open-source intelligence gatherers (people looking at the internet) spotted that the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered merchant vessel with a Russian captain, on its way from the Russian port of Ust-Luga to Port Said in Egypt, was above both cables at around the time they were severed.
What happened next was largely predictable. The online commentators were quick to judge, noting the vessel’s unusual movements and suggesting that it had slowed down to drag its anchor across the cables. Their view was clear, “if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck”. Pictures are now emerging of the ship showing twisted anchor flukes – guilty as charged.
Expert maritime analysts such as Sal Mercogliano were less quick to judge. As ever with events at sea, things are rarely as straightforward as the initial reports suggest.
Yi Peng’s movements from sailing on 11 November are a little unusual; going to anchor straight from alongside, then moving anchorage nearer the port – but then many shipping movements are unusual to anyone outside the ship or company, we just never take much notice. She then gets underway heading along the traffic lanes at about 9-10 knots until 17 November when she slows to seven knots. Again, this is a little odd but with 30 knots of wind on the ship’s head and 2.5-metre swells, hardly inexplicable.
As she crosses the first cable to be cut early on the 17th she is still doing just under seven knots. By midday, ship-tracking websites are no longer receiving updates from her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder and this remains the case for about seven hours. Then updates start coming through again and her speed during the dark period is estimated as seven knots.
It should be noted at this point that while AIS is invaluable as an aid to help avoid collisions (which is what it was designed for) it is often not accurate or reliable enough to assist in detailed investigations. I’m occasionally surprised by the weight attached to it during Russian ‘dark fleet’ investigations – back when I was doing fishery protection, it was not deemed reliable enough to be used as evidence in court. In other words, AIS data is useful but should not be treated as a smoking gun.
It should also be borne in mind that normally a ship’s AIS equipment transmits its data only by VHF radio. This means that other ships nearby can receive it – this is, after all, primarily what the system is for. Ship-tracking websites receive much of their data via shore-based AIS receivers connected to the internet, typically run by volunteer enthusiasts. The ship-tracking services will often give away receivers for free to people in places they would like to cover.
More and more these days, there are likely to be satellites overhead which will pick up AIS signals even if no shore station receives them, but not all such satellite constellations make that data available to others, and not all tracker websites use – or can afford – all the available satellite data. Also, satellite AIS data often takes a long time to update, as there may be a wait for another satellite to pass over the area.
VHF without satellites involved is generally fairly short ranging, and sometimes there may be no shore station that can pick up a ship’s transmissions. In that case it may disappear from the tracking websites, even if its transponder is actually on and transmitting. A ship ‘going dark’ doesn’t always mean that its transponder has been turned off on purpose.
Written by Tom Sharpe who was a Royal Navy officer for 27 years and captained four different warships
Two weekends ago data cables in the Baltic Sea – one between Sweden and Lithuania, the other Finland and Germany – were severed.
At the same time, ever vigilant maritime open-source intelligence gatherers (people looking at the internet) spotted that the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered merchant vessel with a Russian captain, on its way from the Russian port of Ust-Luga to Port Said in Egypt, was above both cables at around the time they were severed.
What happened next was largely predictable. The online commentators were quick to judge, noting the vessel’s unusual movements and suggesting that it had slowed down to drag its anchor across the cables. Their view was clear, “if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck”. Pictures are now emerging of the ship showing twisted anchor flukes – guilty as charged.
Expert maritime analysts such as Sal Mercogliano were less quick to judge. As ever with events at sea, things are rarely as straightforward as the initial reports suggest.
Yi Peng’s movements from sailing on 11 November are a little unusual; going to anchor straight from alongside, then moving anchorage nearer the port – but then many shipping movements are unusual to anyone outside the ship or company, we just never take much notice. She then gets underway heading along the traffic lanes at about 9-10 knots until 17 November when she slows to seven knots. Again, this is a little odd but with 30 knots of wind on the ship’s head and 2.5-metre swells, hardly inexplicable.
As she crosses the first cable to be cut early on the 17th she is still doing just under seven knots. By midday, ship-tracking websites are no longer receiving updates from her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder and this remains the case for about seven hours. Then updates start coming through again and her speed during the dark period is estimated as seven knots.
It should be noted at this point that while AIS is invaluable as an aid to help avoid collisions (which is what it was designed for) it is often not accurate or reliable enough to assist in detailed investigations. I’m occasionally surprised by the weight attached to it during Russian ‘dark fleet’ investigations – back when I was doing fishery protection, it was not deemed reliable enough to be used as evidence in court. In other words, AIS data is useful but should not be treated as a smoking gun.
It should also be borne in mind that normally a ship’s AIS equipment transmits its data only by VHF radio. This means that other ships nearby can receive it – this is, after all, primarily what the system is for. Ship-tracking websites receive much of their data via shore-based AIS receivers connected to the internet, typically run by volunteer enthusiasts. The ship-tracking services will often give away receivers for free to people in places they would like to cover.
More and more these days, there are likely to be satellites overhead which will pick up AIS signals even if no shore station receives them, but not all such satellite constellations make that data available to others, and not all tracker websites use – or can afford – all the available satellite data. Also, satellite AIS data often takes a long time to update, as there may be a wait for another satellite to pass over the area.
VHF without satellites involved is generally fairly short ranging, and sometimes there may be no shore station that can pick up a ship’s transmissions. In that case it may disappear from the tracking websites, even if its transponder is actually on and transmitting. A ship ‘going dark’ doesn’t always mean that its transponder has been turned off on purpose.
In any case, Yi Peng, still updating regularly, then crossed the second cable to be cut at 0200 on the 18 November still doing seven knots. At 0800 that morning she stops in the water for about an hour and conducts a small circuit due south of Karlskrona. This manoeuvre is unusual but similarly inconclusive.
By now she has attracted quite an array of warships to keep her company and the rhetoric from Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Lithuania is all saying this needs to be treated as sabotage and investigated accordingly. Interestingly the US also joined the conversation but took a different track saying ‘nothing to see here’.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Russia’s involvement, saying it was “quite absurd” to point a finger at them in the absence of evidence. China is equally clear that its vessels always obey the laws of the sea… So far, so normal.
But now it starts to deviate a little from similar incidents in the past. The first sign this is being treated differently is the Danish frigate HDMS Niels Juel which has been escorting the Yi Peng now does so in a way that forces it to change course – ie gets in the way. This is quite aggressive and while this sort of thing has been a feature of maritime interdictions for centuries, in ‘peace dividend’ times, such ‘riding off’ was deemed aggressive and you would normally not be granted the freedom under Rules of Engagement to do it.
Yi Peng is then boarded by a Danish pilot, which is pretty standard for a ship about to go through the Danish Straits, and taken to an anchorage in the Kattegat north of the Straits – but outside Danish territorial waters. This is not standard. And there she remains.
By Wednesday, she had the Russian corvette Merkury close by, some coastguard vessels and various patrol boats. The Danes have also declared a ‘firing exercise area’ around her; a practical measure and a punchy message but no more than that I would suggest.
So what has the Yi Peng done to invoke such a strong response from Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Lithuania? To me, there are four possibilities.
First, the Yi Peng dragged a device from the stern that cut the cables as it went over the top. The depth of water at the first cable was 170 metres, which is deep, but then beam trawlers do something similar down to 200 metres (which makes a pretty good mess of the seabed as well as it happens). Pelagic fishing boats have nets with transponders fitted that allow the skipper to ‘fly’ the net just a few metres above the seabed; it would not be impossible to make something to combine the two that could be lowered with reasonable precision as the ship passes over the charted cable position.
Seven knots is fast for this sort of thing and such equipment would need to be mighty strong not to be wrenched out of the deck or break, but it’s just about doable. A simple thing which might work would be a long length of abrasive wire or cable trailed sliding along on the sea bed, which would slide over the data cable and cut through it like a wire saw as it did.
But in this case, why did theYi Peng keep transmitting on AIS during both periods as they were over the cables? This makes little sense – why would you declare your position if you were up to no good?
By now she has attracted quite an array of warships to keep her company and the rhetoric from Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Lithuania is all saying this needs to be treated as sabotage and investigated accordingly. Interestingly the US also joined the conversation but took a different track saying ‘nothing to see here’.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Russia’s involvement, saying it was “quite absurd” to point a finger at them in the absence of evidence. China is equally clear that its vessels always obey the laws of the sea… So far, so normal.
But now it starts to deviate a little from similar incidents in the past. The first sign this is being treated differently is the Danish frigate HDMS Niels Juel which has been escorting the Yi Peng now does so in a way that forces it to change course – ie gets in the way. This is quite aggressive and while this sort of thing has been a feature of maritime interdictions for centuries, in ‘peace dividend’ times, such ‘riding off’ was deemed aggressive and you would normally not be granted the freedom under Rules of Engagement to do it.
Yi Peng is then boarded by a Danish pilot, which is pretty standard for a ship about to go through the Danish Straits, and taken to an anchorage in the Kattegat north of the Straits – but outside Danish territorial waters. This is not standard. And there she remains.
By Wednesday, she had the Russian corvette Merkury close by, some coastguard vessels and various patrol boats. The Danes have also declared a ‘firing exercise area’ around her; a practical measure and a punchy message but no more than that I would suggest.
So what has the Yi Peng done to invoke such a strong response from Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Lithuania? To me, there are four possibilities.
First, the Yi Peng dragged a device from the stern that cut the cables as it went over the top. The depth of water at the first cable was 170 metres, which is deep, but then beam trawlers do something similar down to 200 metres (which makes a pretty good mess of the seabed as well as it happens). Pelagic fishing boats have nets with transponders fitted that allow the skipper to ‘fly’ the net just a few metres above the seabed; it would not be impossible to make something to combine the two that could be lowered with reasonable precision as the ship passes over the charted cable position.
Seven knots is fast for this sort of thing and such equipment would need to be mighty strong not to be wrenched out of the deck or break, but it’s just about doable. A simple thing which might work would be a long length of abrasive wire or cable trailed sliding along on the sea bed, which would slide over the data cable and cut through it like a wire saw as it did.
But in this case, why did theYi Peng keep transmitting on AIS during both periods as they were over the cables? This makes little sense – why would you declare your position if you were up to no good?
The second scenario is that the Yi Peng spoofed (falsified) its AIS to make it look like it was doing seven knots when in fact was transiting at 12 knots then slowing down over the cables to deploy something to damage the cables. She therefore averaged seven knots. This would buy them enough time to lower a remotely operated vehicle, a dredge (see above) or even the ship’s main anchor.
The problem with this theory is that any of these manoeuvres would have been identifiable by radar and liable to draw attention. Ships are only watched closely by shore radar when in narrow, busy chokepoints or harbours, but in fairly busy waters like the Baltic the Yi Peng will probably have been on other ships’ radar all the time. If you want to guarantee you attract attention, broadcast an AIS position that doesn’t match a radar picture. That said, it’s unlikely that ordinary merchant vessels going about their business would bother to report a case of an AIS track with no radar blip and a simultaneous blip with no track a few miles away. They might well not notice.
I myself think the use of the main anchor is highly unlikely. It could reach the bottom but the idea of a ship managing to tow one of its anchors along the seabed at seven knots – or at all – is an absurdity. The anchor is specifically designed to dig itself into the ground and prevent the ship going anywhere: that’s what it’s for. Yes anchors sometimes drag, but not at seven knots. Anchors, too, are lowered from the bows not the stern: steering the ship would be impossible. Plus the winches aren’t always that strong on vessels that size. I’m going to take a punt and say it wasn’t the anchor.
The third possibility is radical. Russia, through its GUGI secret underwater service, placed small cutting charges on those cables weeks or months ago and triggered them as the suspect ship passed over the top to elicit the exact response that is currently playing out. Perhaps the necessary coded acoustic signal was sent by the Yi Peng. When the investigation team find no sign of any cutting activity aboard, the diplomatic back-pedalling and embarrassment will be priceless to Russia. Remember, the US is still saying the ship did nothing wrong.
Chinese bulk carrier 'Yi Peng 3' (L) anchored and under surveillance by a Danish naval patrol vessel in the Kattegat. The vessel has been accused of sabotaging undersea cables but the legal way ahead is unclear
Chinese bulk carrier ‘Yi Peng 3’ (L) anchored and under surveillance by a Danish naval patrol vessel in the Kattegat. The vessel has been accused of sabotaging undersea cables but the legal way ahead is unclear Credit: EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
Fourth is perhaps the likeliest scenario. The Yi Peng did nothing wrong and just happened to be passing over the two cables at around the time they were broken by something else. Its AIS either broke down for a bit or simply went out of the tracker websites’ coverage, or the crew turned it off for some other reason – after all it was switched on when the ship crossed the cables. There are more than a hundred cable breaks around the world every year: there’s a large global fleet of cable ships that spends all its time repairing them. The vast majority of cable breaks don’t involve malicious action, and getting two quite close together in time and space is far from unheard of.
After all, if these breaks were part of a plan by Russia or China, what was it supposed to achieve? Plenty of alternate data routes remained in operation, and there was no significant effect on communications in and around the Baltic. The broken cables will be back in service any day now.
The problem with this theory is that any of these manoeuvres would have been identifiable by radar and liable to draw attention. Ships are only watched closely by shore radar when in narrow, busy chokepoints or harbours, but in fairly busy waters like the Baltic the Yi Peng will probably have been on other ships’ radar all the time. If you want to guarantee you attract attention, broadcast an AIS position that doesn’t match a radar picture. That said, it’s unlikely that ordinary merchant vessels going about their business would bother to report a case of an AIS track with no radar blip and a simultaneous blip with no track a few miles away. They might well not notice.
I myself think the use of the main anchor is highly unlikely. It could reach the bottom but the idea of a ship managing to tow one of its anchors along the seabed at seven knots – or at all – is an absurdity. The anchor is specifically designed to dig itself into the ground and prevent the ship going anywhere: that’s what it’s for. Yes anchors sometimes drag, but not at seven knots. Anchors, too, are lowered from the bows not the stern: steering the ship would be impossible. Plus the winches aren’t always that strong on vessels that size. I’m going to take a punt and say it wasn’t the anchor.
The third possibility is radical. Russia, through its GUGI secret underwater service, placed small cutting charges on those cables weeks or months ago and triggered them as the suspect ship passed over the top to elicit the exact response that is currently playing out. Perhaps the necessary coded acoustic signal was sent by the Yi Peng. When the investigation team find no sign of any cutting activity aboard, the diplomatic back-pedalling and embarrassment will be priceless to Russia. Remember, the US is still saying the ship did nothing wrong.
Chinese bulk carrier 'Yi Peng 3' (L) anchored and under surveillance by a Danish naval patrol vessel in the Kattegat. The vessel has been accused of sabotaging undersea cables but the legal way ahead is unclear
Chinese bulk carrier ‘Yi Peng 3’ (L) anchored and under surveillance by a Danish naval patrol vessel in the Kattegat. The vessel has been accused of sabotaging undersea cables but the legal way ahead is unclear Credit: EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
Fourth is perhaps the likeliest scenario. The Yi Peng did nothing wrong and just happened to be passing over the two cables at around the time they were broken by something else. Its AIS either broke down for a bit or simply went out of the tracker websites’ coverage, or the crew turned it off for some other reason – after all it was switched on when the ship crossed the cables. There are more than a hundred cable breaks around the world every year: there’s a large global fleet of cable ships that spends all its time repairing them. The vast majority of cable breaks don’t involve malicious action, and getting two quite close together in time and space is far from unheard of.
After all, if these breaks were part of a plan by Russia or China, what was it supposed to achieve? Plenty of alternate data routes remained in operation, and there was no significant effect on communications in and around the Baltic. The broken cables will be back in service any day now.
The interesting thing about the Yi Peng business to me is that Denmark has already effectively arrested the ship: that’s new. The Danes and Swedes in particular are looking at legal routes to send an inspection team on board as well as just the pilot. As I write this, it isn’t clear whether this has happened yet. Clearly, ‘just’ a pilot onboard reviewing paperwork or a full investigation team downloading nav data and inspecting upper deck fittings have different implications.
This is the crux of it. Boarding ships in international waters, or even in your own waters, is harder to do legally than many realise. Legal grounds for a boarding are tightly restricted, and there is no suggestion that the Yi Peng was engaged in one of the obvious ones like piracy or slave trading. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is something we hold dear to our hearts and you can’t do your best to uphold it in one part of the world and then breach it in another because it suits you. It’s also classically ambiguous, almost as if it was written by lawyers for lawyers. However, buried deep in Article 113 is a relevant paragraph:
“Every State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable, shall be a punishable offence.”
But how does one determine culpability prior to punishment whilst still at sea?
Article 10 of the 1884 International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables is more helpful and is possibly the one that has been invoked this time:
“Offences against the present Convention may be verified by all means of proof allowed by the legislation of the country of the court. When the officers commanding the ships of war, or ships specially commissioned for the purpose by one of the High Contracting Parties, have reason to believe that an infraction of the measures provided for in the present Convention has been committed by a vessel other than a vessel of war, they may demand from the captain or master the production of the official documents proving the nationality of the said vessel. The fact of such document having been exhibited shall then be endorsed upon it immediately.”
This is the crux of it. Boarding ships in international waters, or even in your own waters, is harder to do legally than many realise. Legal grounds for a boarding are tightly restricted, and there is no suggestion that the Yi Peng was engaged in one of the obvious ones like piracy or slave trading. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is something we hold dear to our hearts and you can’t do your best to uphold it in one part of the world and then breach it in another because it suits you. It’s also classically ambiguous, almost as if it was written by lawyers for lawyers. However, buried deep in Article 113 is a relevant paragraph:
“Every State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable, shall be a punishable offence.”
But how does one determine culpability prior to punishment whilst still at sea?
Article 10 of the 1884 International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables is more helpful and is possibly the one that has been invoked this time:
“Offences against the present Convention may be verified by all means of proof allowed by the legislation of the country of the court. When the officers commanding the ships of war, or ships specially commissioned for the purpose by one of the High Contracting Parties, have reason to believe that an infraction of the measures provided for in the present Convention has been committed by a vessel other than a vessel of war, they may demand from the captain or master the production of the official documents proving the nationality of the said vessel. The fact of such document having been exhibited shall then be endorsed upon it immediately.”
That’s better but still stops short of granting legal authority to board at sea. It might mean you can board to inspect nationality papers but that’s not the same as sending a team back aft to look for evidence of recently ditched winches, cables and hooks. I have had many conversations with excellent lawyers on this subject, largely around the increasing requirement to find legal ways to board Russia’s dark fleet at sea, and I can tell you this; they all end with furrowed brows and then saying “it’s complicated”.
Have the Danes cracked this nut? They have certainly been forward-leaning in providing legal solutions to dark fleet activities and are clearly managing this ongoing situation aggressively. It could be a game-changer if they have.
Only two weeks ago the Russian spy ship Yantar was hovering over data cables in the Irish Sea. The Royal Navy and Air Force shadowed, tracked and monitored – all good conventional activities – and eventually the Russians departed. I wrote then about how we need to be smarter in how we counter these grey zone or hybrid warfare activities. In the Cold War, Yantar would probably have left the area with less equipment she arrived with courtesy of our submarine chums, but if what is going on now in the Baltic proves to be legal, then that would be a much easier solution.
It also forms part of the broader crackdown on the ageing and unsafe dark fleet of tankers carrying Putin’s oil and bankrolling his murderous war. On Monday, the UK government sanctioned 30 such tankers, one of which was for “failing to provide insurance details to our coast guard whilst transiting the English Channel”. We are getting better at this counter-grey zone as well, it seems.
This is the war we are currently in. Everyone is fixated on the Russian missile threat into the UK – as if that was a new thing – but these sort of hybrid attacks and operations are actually happening every day. We need a comprehensive solution to tackle them from legal frameworks (agreed before the event) to Rules of Engagement discussions based on those findings. We need to work on tracking ships using technologies such as satellite-based radio fingerprinting – which is, for the moment at least, much harder to spoof or silence than AIS. There are AI and satellite companies screaming for the opportunity to release their solutions for this problem set. Contracts allowing them to do so should be coming thick and fast if we are to detect and deter what would amount to thousands of ships worldwide that could attack our cables in this manner.
And, of course, we need more kit; warships, paramilitary enforcement vessels, cable ships, crewed and uncrewed vessels, planes etc that can all help with tackling this ever-present threat. The Yi Peng 3 boarding is an important messaging watershed from the Baltic states involved – we have had enough. It remains to be seen if it turns out to be a game-changing legal case as well.
------------------------- END --------------------------
Have the Danes cracked this nut? They have certainly been forward-leaning in providing legal solutions to dark fleet activities and are clearly managing this ongoing situation aggressively. It could be a game-changer if they have.
Only two weeks ago the Russian spy ship Yantar was hovering over data cables in the Irish Sea. The Royal Navy and Air Force shadowed, tracked and monitored – all good conventional activities – and eventually the Russians departed. I wrote then about how we need to be smarter in how we counter these grey zone or hybrid warfare activities. In the Cold War, Yantar would probably have left the area with less equipment she arrived with courtesy of our submarine chums, but if what is going on now in the Baltic proves to be legal, then that would be a much easier solution.
It also forms part of the broader crackdown on the ageing and unsafe dark fleet of tankers carrying Putin’s oil and bankrolling his murderous war. On Monday, the UK government sanctioned 30 such tankers, one of which was for “failing to provide insurance details to our coast guard whilst transiting the English Channel”. We are getting better at this counter-grey zone as well, it seems.
This is the war we are currently in. Everyone is fixated on the Russian missile threat into the UK – as if that was a new thing – but these sort of hybrid attacks and operations are actually happening every day. We need a comprehensive solution to tackle them from legal frameworks (agreed before the event) to Rules of Engagement discussions based on those findings. We need to work on tracking ships using technologies such as satellite-based radio fingerprinting – which is, for the moment at least, much harder to spoof or silence than AIS. There are AI and satellite companies screaming for the opportunity to release their solutions for this problem set. Contracts allowing them to do so should be coming thick and fast if we are to detect and deter what would amount to thousands of ships worldwide that could attack our cables in this manner.
And, of course, we need more kit; warships, paramilitary enforcement vessels, cable ships, crewed and uncrewed vessels, planes etc that can all help with tackling this ever-present threat. The Yi Peng 3 boarding is an important messaging watershed from the Baltic states involved – we have had enough. It remains to be seen if it turns out to be a game-changing legal case as well.
------------------------- END --------------------------
F
Filter
Guest
Le coût pharamineux du couronnement de Charles III fait enrager les Britanniques
Un an et demi après le couronnement de Charles III, les chiffres officiels ont dévoilé une facture salée pour les contribuables britanniques.
madame.lefigaro.fr
A regnáló angol király, koronázási ünnepsége 86.6 millió euróba került.
Az angolok mérgesek.
Le coût pharamineux du couronnement de Charles III fait enrager les Britanniques
Un an et demi après le couronnement de Charles III, les chiffres officiels ont dévoilé une facture salée pour les contribuables britanniques.
A regnáló angol király, koronázási ünnepsége 86.6 millió euróba került.
Az angolok mérgesek.
Költhették volna aliékra is,hiszen ők is emberek,nem szép dolog elfelejtkezni róluk!
F
Filter
Guest
Mikor megy a sitre ez a tolvaj?
Vagy kijátsza az igazságszolgáltatást a sikkasztó család?
