Ket evvel kesobb nemsokara megint jon az uj brit defense review, mar az ukran tapasztalatokkal; egyes cikkek mar szelloztetik, hogy Wallace az EWt, a legvedelmet es "melysegi" azaz long range tuzerseget akarja elsonek fejleszteni.
-
Ha nem vagy kibékülve az alapértelmezettnek beállított sötét sablonnal, akkor a korábbi ígéretnek megfelelően bármikor átválthatsz a korábbi világos színekkel dolgozó kinézetre.
Ehhez görgess a lap aljára és a baloldalon keresd a HTKA Dark feliratú gombot. Kattints rá, majd a megnyíló ablakban válaszd a HTKA Light lehetőséget. Választásod a böngésződ elmenti cookie-ba, így amikor legközelebb érkezel ezt a műveletsort nem kell megismételned. -
Az elmúlt időszak tapasztalatai alapján házirendet kapott a topic.
Ezen témában - a fórumon rendhagyó módon - az oldal üzemeltetője saját álláspontja, meggyőződése alapján nem enged bizonyos véleményeket, mivel meglátása szerint az káros a járványhelyzet enyhítését célzó törekvésekre.
Kérünk, hogy a vírus veszélyességét kétségbe vonó, oltásellenes véleményed más platformon fejtsd ki. Nálunk ennek nincs helye. Az ilyen hozzászólásokért 1 alkalommal figyelmeztetés jár, majd folytatása esetén a témáról letiltás. Arra is kérünk, hogy a fórum más témáiba ne vigyétek át, mert azért viszont már a fórum egészéről letiltás járhat hosszabb-rövidebb időre.
-
Az elmúlt időszak tapasztalatai alapján frissített házirendet kapott a topic.
--- VÁLTOZÁS A MODERÁLÁSBAN ---
A források, hírek preferáltak. Azoknak, akik veszik a fáradságot és összegyűjtik ezeket a főként harcokkal, a háború jelenlegi állásával és haditechnika szempontjából érdekes híreket, (mindegy milyen oldali) forrásokkal alátámasztják és bonuszként legalább a címet egy google fordítóba berakják, azoknak ismételten köszönjük az áldozatos munkáját és további kitartást kívánunk nekik!
Ami nem a topik témájába vág vagy akár csak erősebb hangnemben is kerül megfogalmazásra, az valamilyen formában szankcionálva lesz
Minden olyan hozzászólásért ami nem hír, vagy szorosan a konfliktushoz kapcsolódó vélemény / elemzés azért instant 3 nap topic letiltás jár. Aki pedig ezzel trükközne és folytatná másik topicban annak 2 hónap fórum ban a jussa.
RAF topic nincs, így ide
www.raf.mod.uk
Chief of the Air Staff Statement on RAF Recruiting Inquiry
Today, the Royal Air Force has released a report following an inquiry regarding recruiting and selection practices. A statement from Air Chief Marshal Sir Rich Knighton, Chief of the Air Staff, can be viewed be
www.raf.mod.uk
Head of British Army expected to stand down next year after short stint in job
Gen Sir Patrick Sanders has only been Chief of the General Staff for a year, an appointment that normally lasts around three.
Ugyan honapok ota sumakolnak, de most mar a Sunak sem tudja tovabb halogatni, hogy kideruljon az igazsag: https://www.forces.net/politics/defence-command-paper-2023-you-will-see-it-next-week-says-sunak
Too little, too late, bar a nyakig szarban ulo brit gazdasagban mondjuk meg lehet eselye, mert legalabb stabil lesz...
A brit problemakat felreteve - bar azokbol is rengeteget lehet tanulni - batorkodnam idemasolni a nemzetkozi osszehasonlitasrol szolo reszt, az a magyar hadiipari beszerzesekkel szembeallitva is nagyon hasznos dolgokra mutat ra (@Terminator esetleg mozgasd at mashova?):
5 International comparators
61. As part of our inquiry we looked at a number of international comparators to see what could be learned from international practice. Whilst visiting the US in March 2023 in relation to a separate inquiry, we received a detailed briefing at the Pentagon on the evolving US defence procurement model. In May 2023 we also received a briefing from the Defence Attaché and the Defence Equipment Attaché from the French Embassy in London. In July 2023 we received a briefing from Israeli officials on the Israeli procurement method. Together, the three different systems enabled us to draw valuable comparisons and lessons for the UK’s system.
France
62. The French equivalent to DE&S, the Direction générale de l’armement (Directorate General of Armament, or DGA), holds a very different position within the French system from DE&S. We were told that the French Services generate their requests and requirements, which are given to the Joint Staff for the Armed Forces (the French equivalent to the UK’s Chief of Defence Staff, or Chef d’État-Major des Armées (CEMA)). The CEMA then sifts and prioritises those requests and engages in a process with the DGA. At this early stage, the DGA is already involved in defining the required capabilities.
63. The DGA’s involvement in requirement setting illustrates how it is more powerful within the French system than DE&S is within the UK system. The DGA’s priorities are also different to those of DE&S. Both the French embassy and Sir Bernard Gray told us that in France sustaining the industrial base and exportability of equipment often take precedent over the requests of the Services.
64. The DGA’s focus on the maintenance of the industrial base, the skills base and the workforce are also lacking in DE&S, which is symptomatic of a major difference between the public sectors in our two countries. We were told that the DGA considers skills and workforce as a capability in and of itself. Therefore, in managing a contract, the DGA does not limit itself to engaging with the prime only. Instead, the DGA manages and engages with the supply chain all the way down to tier 4 suppliers. In doing so, skills are managed and maintained.
65. Another key difference between DE&S and the DGA is that in France altering the original requirements and reopening a contract is a significant undertaking that is not embarked upon lightly. In the French system, materially amending the original requirement necessitates specific ministerial approval. Conversely, in the UK, making changes to requirements (and thus to contracts) is often regarded as an expected part of the process.
66. However, it is noteworthy that French defence industry is characterised by a degree of state ownership in a way that the UK’s defence industry is not. As such, the incentives, priorities and maintenance of the industrial base hold a different position within the French political and defence system.
United States
67. The US acquisition process is run by officials (both civilian and military). The process only begins once a requirement for a capability has been agreed following advice prepared by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. Once a budget is agreed, the programme to acquire the capability moves into the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). As a result of the adoption of an ‘adaptive acquisition framework’, the DoD has different acquisition approaches for different types of capability (Urgent Capability Acquisition; Major Capability Acquisition; Middle Tier Acquisition; Software Acquisition; Defense Business Systems (DBS) Acquisition; and Defense Acquisition of Services).
68. Unlike the UK, the Acquisition and Sustainment section is involved in wider policy work. While we were in Washington in March 2023, we were told that Congress had recently directed that Acquisition and Sustainment elevate the importance of the Industrial Base within its policy making. In February 2022, it had already published a public Report on the vulnerabilities in the US Industrial Base which found gaps in:
- • Kinetics (ammunition and hypersonics)
- • Castings and forgings
- • Micro electronics
- • Energy storage
- • Critical and strategic minerals.
69. We also heard from the US Administration, industry and commentators that there were a number of bottlenecks within the US industrial base limiting the extent to which it could ramp up production, following the transfer of significant amounts of US stockpiles to Ukraine. These included:
- • A lack of excess capacity in defence Primes;
- • Companies lower down the supply chain (particularly Tier 3 or 4, single source suppliers) unable to expand production;
- • A high attrition rate of the workforce, which is also aging (estimated to be twice that in the Defence Industry prior to COVID); and
- • A lack of notice of new Government contracts making it difficult to plan how best to increase production capacity.
70. However, we also heard positive messages from industry about how they were intending to increase production capacity for key capabilities and that some companies are considering creating their own stockpiles of munitions and equipment in order to smooth out the peaks and troughs caused by the ‘feast and famine’ procurement approach, including in an attempt to retain skilled staff. We heard that consideration was being given to the adoption of multi-year procurements to avoid creating such peaks and troughs. Furthermore, there appeared to be a real acknowledgement of the importance of working with Allies and partners to create greater resilience within the supply chain.
71. Perhaps the most stark example of urgency we encountered is that in February 2023, the head of the USAF’s Air Mobility Command, General Michael Minihan, instructed his personnel to prepare for combat as “my gut tells me we will fight in 2025” (although in this case, he was speaking more in relation to a potential conflict over Taiwan rather than Ukraine).
Israel
72. Defence procurement is carried out by the Production and Procurement Directorate (DOPP) within the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
73. The Israeli procurement philosophy is different again, partly influenced by their own national characteristics, including, as a nation of some 9 million people (far less than the US, France or the UK) and one which has been invaded by its neighbours, some of them on multiple occasions, since the State of Israel was officially created in 1948. With multiple threats, far closer to home, the Israeli system is characterised by an even greater sense of operational urgency than in the United States with a premium on efficiency, both military and bureaucratic.
74. Specifically, the Israeli Ministry of Defence (as opposed to the Israeli Defence Forces themselves) employs only several thousand people, mostly civil servants but with a number of military officers as well. Within the Israeli MoD, the DOPP, employs only some 300 people, all of whom are civilians (although many of them will have completed Israeli military service in their youth). DOPP also has a sister Directorate, which is involved in the manufacture of certain elements of military kit, usually in association with their indigenous defence companies but again this Directorate only employs several hundred people as well. DOPP procures military equipment specifically for the IDF, including support and through-life contracts, which it oversees but does not participate in directly itself. Equipment maintenance and support for the IDF is carried out by prime and/or associated sub-contractors or by the Israeli military themselves—in stark contrast to DE&S, which was keen to stress to us that many, indeed thousands, of their personnel are involved in the ‘S’ element of DE&S i.e. “support.”
75. In the Israeli system, DOPP does play a role in setting military requirements but, unlike the French DGA, this is largely ‘informal’, by way of frequent contact between DOPP staff and their military requirements “customers”. We were told that, in the event of a disagreement between “what the military want and what they actually need” the military view generally prevails. Nevertheless, DOPP is still more actively involved in helping to shape military requirements–although perhaps without the formal authority of their French counterparts in the DGA.
Lessons
76. Overall, we see that procurement can be done differently and successfully. The French model illustrates the value of having the procurement agency involved much earlier in agreeing operational requirements. By doing that, France is often able to procure more quickly and efficiently. The French system also places much greater value on exportability of domestic equipment than its UK counterpart.
77. The United States is perhaps less directly comparable to the UK given the vastly superior size and budget of its armed forces. However, the growing sense of urgency, in reacting industrially to a worsening international security situation, from our traditionally closest ally, is one that should be recognised and which the UK could surely learn from.
78. The key takeaway from the Israeli procurement method is the value that it extracts from its personnel. Israel procures defence equipment with far fewer people than DE&S does. The Israeli system, which places a premium on efficient use of manpower, by effective use of contractors, manages to achieve similar outcomes to the UK’s DE&S, but with far fewer people.
Fentiekbol a magyar rendszerre az izraeli es a francia rendszerek elonyei direkt modon alkalmazhatoak lennenek... az izraeli, bar a franciaknal sokkal kevesbe hivatalos modon, de ugyanolyan szinten kepes iranyitani a beszerzest, mint a brit vagy akar a francia, joval kisebb stabbal, mert azok tagjain es kepzesen van a hangsuly.
72. Defence procurement is carried out by the Production and Procurement Directorate (DOPP) within the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
73. The Israeli procurement philosophy is different again, partly influenced by their own national characteristics, including, as a nation of some 9 million people (far less than the US, France or the UK) and one which has been invaded by its neighbours, some of them on multiple occasions, since the State of Israel was officially created in 1948. With multiple threats, far closer to home, the Israeli system is characterised by an even greater sense of operational urgency than in the United States with a premium on efficiency, both military and bureaucratic.
74. Specifically, the Israeli Ministry of Defence (as opposed to the Israeli Defence Forces themselves) employs only several thousand people, mostly civil servants but with a number of military officers as well. Within the Israeli MoD, the DOPP, employs only some 300 people, all of whom are civilians (although many of them will have completed Israeli military service in their youth). DOPP also has a sister Directorate, which is involved in the manufacture of certain elements of military kit, usually in association with their indigenous defence companies but again this Directorate only employs several hundred people as well. DOPP procures military equipment specifically for the IDF, including support and through-life contracts, which it oversees but does not participate in directly itself. Equipment maintenance and support for the IDF is carried out by prime and/or associated sub-contractors or by the Israeli military themselves—in stark contrast to DE&S, which was keen to stress to us that many, indeed thousands, of their personnel are involved in the ‘S’ element of DE&S i.e. “support.”
75. In the Israeli system, DOPP does play a role in setting military requirements but, unlike the French DGA, this is largely ‘informal’, by way of frequent contact between DOPP staff and their military requirements “customers”. We were told that, in the event of a disagreement between “what the military want and what they actually need” the military view generally prevails. Nevertheless, DOPP is still more actively involved in helping to shape military requirements–although perhaps without the formal authority of their French counterparts in the DGA.
Lessons
76. Overall, we see that procurement can be done differently and successfully. The French model illustrates the value of having the procurement agency involved much earlier in agreeing operational requirements. By doing that, France is often able to procure more quickly and efficiently. The French system also places much greater value on exportability of domestic equipment than its UK counterpart.
77. The United States is perhaps less directly comparable to the UK given the vastly superior size and budget of its armed forces. However, the growing sense of urgency, in reacting industrially to a worsening international security situation, from our traditionally closest ally, is one that should be recognised and which the UK could surely learn from.
78. The key takeaway from the Israeli procurement method is the value that it extracts from its personnel. Israel procures defence equipment with far fewer people than DE&S does. The Israeli system, which places a premium on efficient use of manpower, by effective use of contractors, manages to achieve similar outcomes to the UK’s DE&S, but with far fewer people.
Fentiekbol a magyar rendszerre az izraeli es a francia rendszerek elonyei direkt modon alkalmazhatoak lennenek... az izraeli, bar a franciaknal sokkal kevesbe hivatalos modon, de ugyanolyan szinten kepes iranyitani a beszerzest, mint a brit vagy akar a francia, joval kisebb stabbal, mert azok tagjain es kepzesen van a hangsuly.
Wallace már nem fog semmit fejleszteni. Zokon vették az amazonos beszólását.
Defence Command Paper Refresh: What you need to know about today's announcement
The Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) comes after the publication of the Integrated Review Refresh earlier this year.