[BIZTPOL] Amerikai Egyesült Államok, Kanada

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    Ehhez görgess a lap aljára és a baloldalon keresd a HTKA Dark feliratú gombot. Kattints rá, majd a megnyíló ablakban válaszd a HTKA Light lehetőséget. Választásod a böngésződ elmenti cookie-ba, így amikor legközelebb érkezel ezt a műveletsort nem kell megismételned.
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    Ezen témában - a fórumon rendhagyó módon - az oldal üzemeltetője saját álláspontja, meggyőződése alapján nem enged bizonyos véleményeket, mivel meglátása szerint az káros a járványhelyzet enyhítését célzó törekvésekre.

    Kérünk, hogy a vírus veszélyességét kétségbe vonó, oltásellenes véleményed más platformon fejtsd ki. Nálunk ennek nincs helye. Az ilyen hozzászólásokért 1 alkalommal figyelmeztetés jár, majd folytatása esetén a témáról letiltás. Arra is kérünk, hogy a fórum más témáiba ne vigyétek át, mert azért viszont már a fórum egészéről letiltás járhat hosszabb-rövidebb időre.

  • Az elmúlt időszak tapasztalatai alapján frissített házirendet kapott a topic.

    --- VÁLTOZÁS A MODERÁLÁSBAN ---

    A források, hírek preferáltak. Azoknak, akik veszik a fáradságot és összegyűjtik ezeket a főként harcokkal, a háború jelenlegi állásával és haditechnika szempontjából érdekes híreket, (mindegy milyen oldali) forrásokkal alátámasztják és bonuszként legalább a címet egy google fordítóba berakják, azoknak ismételten köszönjük az áldozatos munkáját és további kitartást kívánunk nekik!

    Ami nem a topik témájába vág vagy akár csak erősebb hangnemben is kerül megfogalmazásra, az valamilyen formában szankcionálva lesz

    Minden olyan hozzászólásért ami nem hír, vagy szorosan a konfliktushoz kapcsolódó vélemény / elemzés azért instant 3 nap topic letiltás jár. Aki pedig ezzel trükközne és folytatná másik topicban annak 2 hónap fórum ban a jussa.

    Az új szabályzat teljes szövege itt olvasható el.

perceptron

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Nem új fiú.

Krekó Péter

Wikipedia
https://hu.wikipedia.org

A Political Capital Institute Igazgatója, vezető külső kutató a washingtoni Center for European Policy Analysis think-tanknél. Krekó Péter. Született, 1980.

Ooo, a PC nevu CIA-outletet ismerjuk jol. :)

Az amerikai National Endowment for Democracy konkretan finanszirozza is oket - ez az a NED, amelyikrol nyiltan kimondtak mar tobbszor is, hogy kulfoldi politikai beavatkozasokra lett letrehozva meg Reagan alatt, olyamikre, amit regen meg a CIA csinalt nyers erovel (ami mar nem volt tobbe vallalhato):

Par eve Max Blumenthalek csinaltak errol egy jo osszefoglalot:


Leggyonyorubb: ez a Kreko nevu hazaarulo konkretan "was a Reagan-Fascell Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy." Eskuszom, buszken hirdeti is magarol.
 

perceptron

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Amugy komoly kutatasok is nyiltan elemzik, hogy mire lett raallitva 1990 utan a NED, a "spyless coups" azaz kemek nelkuli puccsok eleresere - van nekem errol egy regebbi pdfem ezugyben, meg online is elerheto (de csak ha van megfelelo pl. egyetemi logined):

A lenyeg kb. az elso ket oldalon elhangzik:


KATE GEOGHEGAN
A Policy in Tension: The National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Response to the Collapse of the Soviet Union

The failure of a hardline coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991 spelled the end of Communist Party (CPSU) rule in the USSR and left the Soviet state teetering on the brink of dissolution. In a September 1991 article in the Washington Post, David Ignatius attributed the coup’s defeat—as well as the crumbling of Soviet-style communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989—in part to a new weapon in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal: independent, overt democracy aid. “[T]he old era of covert action,” Ignatius proclaimed, “is dead.” Instead, over the past decade, a new “network” of private democracy organizations based in the United States had been “doing in public what the CIA used to do” covertly. By providing assistance to anti-communist groups in
the Soviet bloc, he argued, these organizations had played a key role in nurturing the growth of democratic opposition movements across the Soviet empire.1

Ignatius’s analysis illuminates an important but understudied development in the final years of the Cold War: the rise of private democracy organizations as tools of U.S. foreign policy.2
Most accounts of the influence of independent actors in U.S. Soviet relations during this period focus on the role of transnational human rights and peace networks in ending the Cold War by fostering “new thinking” in the Soviet Union and the amelioration of superpower tensions.3
Less attention has been paid to analyzing the nature and impact of efforts by newly established independent democracy organizations based in the United States to make inroads in the increasingly accessible USSR.4

This article addresses this oversight by examining the efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to promote democracy in the Soviet Union in the years preceding its December 1991 collapse. Dubbed by Ignatius the “sugar daddy of overt operations,” the Endowment was among the most prominent of the newly created democracy organizations.5
An independent, congressionally funded “quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization,” the NED was created in 1983 to staunch the spread of communism globally by assisting democratic non-governmental forces in hostile communist and friendly authoritarian regimes.6
It was founded on the notion that—in contrast to the discredited covert CIA operations of the early Cold War—its transparency and independence would enable it to promote democracy abroad without inviting backlash against the U.S. government or damaging official U.S. relationships.7

In particular, Reagan administration officials reasoned, these features of the Endowment would enable the United States to conduct a “two track” strategy toward the Soviet Union, “support[ing] democratic forces in the Soviet world . . . while continuing official state-to-state relations and negotiations.”8

While new scholarship has emerged on the institutional origins of the NED, few historians have analyzed in depth the Endowment’s actual activities or the relationship of those activities to official U.S. policy.9 As a result, our understanding of how the NED’s establishment—and the privatization of de mocracy aid more generally—affected the practice of U.S. foreign policy and altered the strategic role of democracy promotion within that policy is lacking.
This is true particularly regarding the U.S. response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Neither historians of the Endowment nor historians of U.S.-Soviet relations have investigated the NED’s role in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s.10
Accounts of the U.S. response to the Soviet collapse focus instead on the George H. W. Bush administration, emphasizing its restrained reaction to Soviet nationalism. These works correctly assert that Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker did not seek to promote—and in some cases worked to prevent—the dissolution of the USSR.11

However, they overlook the fact that the Bush administration did not have a monopoly on U.S. foreign policy. As a result, the current historical picture of U.S. Soviet policy is incomplete.

1. David Ignatius, “Innocence Abroad: The New World of Spyless Coups,” Washington Post, September 22, 1991, C1.
2. Scholars are now exploring in more depth the rise of what Sarah Sunn Bush coined the U.S. “democracy establishment”—an overt network of quasi- and nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and government agencies devoted to dispensing democracy assistance that emerged in response to the global “Third Wave” of democratization and became an entrenched feature of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. For accounts of the rise of this “establishment” see Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators, (Cambridge, UK, 2015); Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC, 1999). On U.S. support for “Third Wave” “transitions,” see Francisco Jimenez, Lorenzo Escalonilla, and Nicholas Cull, eds., U.S. Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy? (New York, 2015). On the post-1991 institutionalization and role of U.S. democracy promotion, see Nicholas Bouchet, Democracy Promotion as U.S. Foreign Policy: Bill Clinton and Democratic Enlargement (New York, 2015); Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Democracy Promotion Paradox (Washington, DC, 2016). On the post-Cold War transnational “diffusion” of democracy promotion, see Tsveta Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy Among Postcommunist States (New York, 2014).
3. On East-West networks and the rise of “new thinking,” see Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West (New York, 2000); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY, 1999); James Voorhees, Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference (Washington, DC, 2002); Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York, 2011).
4. An exception is Michael Kauffman, Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire (New York, 2002), which discusses George Soros’s efforts to establish a foundation in the USSR.
5. Ignatius, “Innocence Abroad,” C1.
6. David Lowe, “Idea to Reality: NED at 30,” accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.ned.org/about/history/.
7. Robert Pee, Democracy Promotion, National Security, and Strategy (New York, 2016), 80. On the CIA’s covert activities through front organizations, see Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer (Cambridge, MA, 2008); Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, The CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony (London, 2002); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2005).
8. Memo, “Conference on Democratization in Communist Countries,” October 18–19, 1982, U.S. Department of State, folder 7, box 30, Allen Weinstein Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (hereafter HIA).
9. Gregory Domber, Empowering Revolution: America, Poland, and the End of the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2014) and Evan McCormick, Beyond Revolution and Repression: U.S. Foreign Policy and Latin American Democracy, 1980–1989 (PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2015) are exceptions. They examine the NED’s role in Poland and Latin America in the 1980s, respectively. Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order (New York, 2005) provides an “intellectual genealogy” of the ideas underpinning the NED; Robert Pee, Democracy Promotion traces the NED’s institutional emergence.
10. Scholars have assessed U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Russia since 1991, but have not deeply examined the origins of these efforts in the Soviet period: see Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, eds. Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post-Communist World (New York, 2009); Sarah L. Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, NY, 2003); Sarah Mendelson, “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 68–106; Lisa Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia (Stanford, CA, 2006).
11. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York, 1995); Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA, 1993); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York, 1998); Jack Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: An Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York, 1995); James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War (Washington, DC, 2003); Louis Sell, From Washington to Moscow: U.S. Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the USSR (Durham, NC, 2016).


Diplomatic History, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2018). VC The Author 2018.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.
 

perceptron

Well-Known Member
2023. június 15.
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Kis osszefoglalo - Trump mar mindenkinel vezet minden battleground allamban, de minimalisan - ezert aztan nem szamit, most a repugokat szamoljak tul stb stb. Miiiiiiiindenre van d-rat magyarazat... :cool:

RCP:

A fontosabbak (AZ es GA szinte biztosak):

MI
RCP Average10/2 - 10/2948.247.7Harris+0.5
Atlas Intel10/25 - 10/29983 LV3.04849Trump+1
InsiderAdvantage10/26 - 10/27800 LV3.74748Trump+1
Emerson10/25 - 10/271000 LV3.04849Trump+1
Susquehanna10/23 - 10/27400 LV4.95247Harris+5
Quinnipiac10/17 - 10/211136 LV2.95046Harris+4
Trafalgar Group (R)10/18 - 10/201090 LV2.94446Trump+2
Bloomberg10/16 - 10/20756 LV4.05047Harris+3
MNS/Mitchell Research10/14 - 10/14589 LV4.04748Trump+1
Rasmussen Reports10/9 - 10/141058 LV3.04848Tie
Fabrizio/Anzalone10/2 - 10/8600 LV4.04849Trump+1

NV
RCP Average10/5 - 10/2948.347.8Trump+0.5
Atlas Intel10/25 - 10/291083 LV3.04948Trump+1
Trafalgar Group (R)10/25 - 10/281082 LV2.94848Tie
CNN*10/21 - 10/26683 LV4.64847Trump+1
Bloomberg10/16 - 10/20449 LV5.04849Harris+1
Fabrizio/Anzalone10/8 - 10/15600 LV4.04947Trump+2
InsiderAdvantage10/20 - 10/21800 LV3.54848Tie
Rasmussen Reports10/9 - 10/14748 LV3.04947Trump+2
The Hill/Emerson10/5 - 10/8900 LV3.24748Harris+1
 
  • Tetszik
Reactions: gatya

perceptron

Well-Known Member
2023. június 15.
6 097
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113
NC
RCP Average10/9 - 10/2948.547.5Trump+1.0
Atlas Intel10/25 - 10/291665 LV3.04849Harris+1
Trafalgar Group (R)10/25 - 10/281091 LV2.94946Trump+3
WRAL-TV/SurveyUSA10/23 - 10/26853 LV4.14747Tie
Elon University10/10 - 10/17800 RV4.04646Tie
Marist10/17 - 10/221226 LV3.65048Trump+2
Emerson10/21 - 10/22950 LV3.15048Trump+2
Bloomberg10/16 - 10/20755 LV4.05049Trump+1
InsiderAdvantage10/19 - 10/20800 LV3.54947Trump+2
Carolina Journal/Cygnal10/12 - 10/14600 LV4.04747Tie
Quinnipiac10/10 - 10/141031 LV3.14750Harris+3
Rasmussen Reports10/9 - 10/141042 LV3.05146Trump+5


PA
RCP Average10/2 - 10/2948.147.5Trump+0.6
CBS News10/22 - 10/281273 LV3.94949Tie
Atlas Intel10/25 - 10/291299 LV3.05047Trump+3
InsiderAdvantage10/26 - 10/27800 LV3.54847Trump+1
AmGreatness/NSOR10/22 - 10/26600 LV4.04747Tie
Emerson10/21 - 10/22860 LV3.34948Trump+1
Bloomberg10/16 - 10/20866 LV3.04850Harris+2
Trafalgar Group (R)10/17 - 10/191084 LV2.94643Trump+3
Franklin & Marshall10/9 - 10/20583 LV5.05049Trump+1
Rasmussen Reports10/9 - 10/131072 LV3.05047Trump+3
NY Times/Siena10/7 - 10/10857 LV4.04750Harris+3
UMass Lowell10/2 - 10/9800 LV4.04546Harris+1

WI
RCP Average10/9 - 10/2948.447.8Trump+0.6
Atlas Intel10/25 - 10/291470 LV3.04949Tie
InsiderAdvantage10/26 - 10/27800 LV3.54948Trump+1
USA Today/Suffolk10/20 - 10/23500 LV4.44847Trump+1
Emerson10/21 - 10/22800 LV3.44948Trump+1
Quinnipiac10/17 - 10/211108 LV2.94848Tie
Trafalgar Group (R)10/18 - 10/201083 LV2.94747Tie
Bloomberg10/16 - 10/20643 LV4.04848Tie
Rasmussen Reports10/9 - 10/141004 LV3.04947Trump+2
 
  • Tetszik
Reactions: gatya

perceptron

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2023. június 15.
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"As of Monday, Trump leads Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris by as close a margin as possible - 0.1% - in the Real Clear Politics average of recent polls. He trailed in the same survey by 7.5% four years ago against Joe Biden and 4.6% in 2016, the year he won the presidency against Hillary Clinton.

The way Trump and his allies see it, the closer the polls in the popular vote, the better his chances to win enough states to capture the Electoral College and the presidency - and he outperformed the polls in both of his previous races.

Democrats say there is reason to doubt that will happen this time around. They said pollsters are compensating for what they call the "hidden Trump voters" of the previous two elections, and, if anything, they are oversampling Republicans and inflating Trump's numbers.

Republican candidates underperformed the polls in the 2022 congressional elections, Democrats said. And Trump consistently underperformed polls in a string of Republican primaries earlier this year."


Nemzeti azaz teljes szovetsegi eredmenyekrol szolo elorejelzesek az elmult 1-5 napbol (a kevesse ismerteket meg kiugroan elteroket hanyagolva):

AtlasIntel - national: Trump +2

Reuters/Ipsos - national: Harris +1

Rasmussen - national: Trump +2

CBS News - national: Harris +1


Biden nemes egyszeruseggel szemeteknek nevezte Trump szavazoit: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/poli...ent-president-calls-trump-supporters-garbage/


Meanwhile, on Wikipedia: :D :D :D

 

gatya

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2012. március 30.
89
341
53

enzo

Well-Known Member
2014. augusztus 4.
14 199
35 806
113

A gépezet, amely átvonszolta Bident a célvonalon 4 éve, megvan továbbra is. Hiába döntöttek úgy esetleg (egyes) zsidók, hogy nekik most Trump kellene mégis.
 

hete

Well-Known Member
2021. január 7.
722
1 791
93
Svájcinéger Kamalát választja




vegas.hu: Trump 1.46 Kamala 2.50
unibet: T 1.5 K 2.7

és tényleg
Fascist_Trump_%21_%2841638399870%29.jpg


Meg kell hagyni a saját oldaláról is beszéltek faxságokat:JD Vance described Trump as "America's Hitler" in 2017
 

perceptron

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2023. június 15.
6 097
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113
Svájcinéger Kamalát választja



Motva, tegnap linkeltem. :p


vegas.hu: Trump 1.46 Kamala 2.50
unibet: T 1.5 K 2.7


és tényleg
Fascist_Trump_%21_%2841638399870%29.jpg


Meg kell hagyni a saját oldaláról is beszéltek faxságokat:JD Vance described Trump as "America's Hitler" in 2017
Reg leragott csont, 7 évvel ezelőtt volt, akkori kontextusban.
 

Filter

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2021. január 7.
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Amugy komoly kutatasok is nyiltan elemzik, hogy mire lett raallitva 1990 utan a NED, a "spyless coups" azaz kemek nelkuli puccsok eleresere - van nekem errol egy regebbi pdfem ezugyben, meg online is elerheto (de csak ha van megfelelo pl. egyetemi logined):

A lenyeg kb. az elso ket oldalon elhangzik:


KATE GEOGHEGAN
A Policy in Tension: The National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Response to the Collapse of the Soviet Union

The failure of a hardline coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991 spelled the end of Communist Party (CPSU) rule in the USSR and left the Soviet state teetering on the brink of dissolution. In a September 1991 article in the Washington Post, David Ignatius attributed the coup’s defeat—as well as the crumbling of Soviet-style communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989—in part to a new weapon in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal: independent, overt democracy aid. “[T]he old era of covert action,” Ignatius proclaimed, “is dead.” Instead, over the past decade, a new “network” of private democracy organizations based in the United States had been “doing in public what the CIA used to do” covertly. By providing assistance to anti-communist groups in
the Soviet bloc, he argued, these organizations had played a key role in nurturing the growth of democratic opposition movements across the Soviet empire.1

Ignatius’s analysis illuminates an important but understudied development in the final years of the Cold War: the rise of private democracy organizations as tools of U.S. foreign policy.2
Most accounts of the influence of independent actors in U.S. Soviet relations during this period focus on the role of transnational human rights and peace networks in ending the Cold War by fostering “new thinking” in the Soviet Union and the amelioration of superpower tensions.3
Less attention has been paid to analyzing the nature and impact of efforts by newly established independent democracy organizations based in the United States to make inroads in the increasingly accessible USSR.4

This article addresses this oversight by examining the efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to promote democracy in the Soviet Union in the years preceding its December 1991 collapse. Dubbed by Ignatius the “sugar daddy of overt operations,” the Endowment was among the most prominent of the newly created democracy organizations.5
An independent, congressionally funded “quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization,” the NED was created in 1983 to staunch the spread of communism globally by assisting democratic non-governmental forces in hostile communist and friendly authoritarian regimes.6
It was founded on the notion that—in contrast to the discredited covert CIA operations of the early Cold War—its transparency and independence would enable it to promote democracy abroad without inviting backlash against the U.S. government or damaging official U.S. relationships.7

In particular, Reagan administration officials reasoned, these features of the Endowment would enable the United States to conduct a “two track” strategy toward the Soviet Union, “support[ing] democratic forces in the Soviet world . . . while continuing official state-to-state relations and negotiations.”8

While new scholarship has emerged on the institutional origins of the NED, few historians have analyzed in depth the Endowment’s actual activities or the relationship of those activities to official U.S. policy.9 As a result, our understanding of how the NED’s establishment—and the privatization of de mocracy aid more generally—affected the practice of U.S. foreign policy and altered the strategic role of democracy promotion within that policy is lacking.
This is true particularly regarding the U.S. response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Neither historians of the Endowment nor historians of U.S.-Soviet relations have investigated the NED’s role in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s.10
Accounts of the U.S. response to the Soviet collapse focus instead on the George H. W. Bush administration, emphasizing its restrained reaction to Soviet nationalism. These works correctly assert that Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker did not seek to promote—and in some cases worked to prevent—the dissolution of the USSR.11

However, they overlook the fact that the Bush administration did not have a monopoly on U.S. foreign policy. As a result, the current historical picture of U.S. Soviet policy is incomplete.

1. David Ignatius, “Innocence Abroad: The New World of Spyless Coups,” Washington Post, September 22, 1991, C1.
2. Scholars are now exploring in more depth the rise of what Sarah Sunn Bush coined the U.S. “democracy establishment”—an overt network of quasi- and nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and government agencies devoted to dispensing democracy assistance that emerged in response to the global “Third Wave” of democratization and became an entrenched feature of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. For accounts of the rise of this “establishment” see Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators, (Cambridge, UK, 2015); Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC, 1999). On U.S. support for “Third Wave” “transitions,” see Francisco Jimenez, Lorenzo Escalonilla, and Nicholas Cull, eds., U.S. Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy? (New York, 2015). On the post-1991 institutionalization and role of U.S. democracy promotion, see Nicholas Bouchet, Democracy Promotion as U.S. Foreign Policy: Bill Clinton and Democratic Enlargement (New York, 2015); Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Democracy Promotion Paradox (Washington, DC, 2016). On the post-Cold War transnational “diffusion” of democracy promotion, see Tsveta Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy Among Postcommunist States (New York, 2014).
3. On East-West networks and the rise of “new thinking,” see Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West (New York, 2000); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY, 1999); James Voorhees, Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference (Washington, DC, 2002); Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York, 2011).
4. An exception is Michael Kauffman, Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire (New York, 2002), which discusses George Soros’s efforts to establish a foundation in the USSR.
5. Ignatius, “Innocence Abroad,” C1.
6. David Lowe, “Idea to Reality: NED at 30,” accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.ned.org/about/history/.
7. Robert Pee, Democracy Promotion, National Security, and Strategy (New York, 2016), 80. On the CIA’s covert activities through front organizations, see Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer (Cambridge, MA, 2008); Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, The CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony (London, 2002); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2005).
8. Memo, “Conference on Democratization in Communist Countries,” October 18–19, 1982, U.S. Department of State, folder 7, box 30, Allen Weinstein Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (hereafter HIA).
9. Gregory Domber, Empowering Revolution: America, Poland, and the End of the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2014) and Evan McCormick, Beyond Revolution and Repression: U.S. Foreign Policy and Latin American Democracy, 1980–1989 (PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2015) are exceptions. They examine the NED’s role in Poland and Latin America in the 1980s, respectively. Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order (New York, 2005) provides an “intellectual genealogy” of the ideas underpinning the NED; Robert Pee, Democracy Promotion traces the NED’s institutional emergence.
10. Scholars have assessed U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Russia since 1991, but have not deeply examined the origins of these efforts in the Soviet period: see Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, eds. Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post-Communist World (New York, 2009); Sarah L. Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, NY, 2003); Sarah Mendelson, “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 68–106; Lisa Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia (Stanford, CA, 2006).
11. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York, 1995); Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA, 1993); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York, 1998); Jack Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: An Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York, 1995); James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War (Washington, DC, 2003); Louis Sell, From Washington to Moscow: U.S. Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the USSR (Durham, NC, 2016).


Diplomatic History, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2018). VC The Author 2018.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.
Akkot ennek moderàlt,finomìtott verziòja az "USAID" napjainkban ?
 

malleusorbis

Well-Known Member
2022. március 21.
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SilvioD

Well-Known Member
2018. december 23.
27 193
96 091
113
Nah, hogy állunk? Kb. 8 biztos elektorral vezet Trump.
Van 108 billegő.
219 Trump, de hogy lesz 270??
Nézzük azt tíz billegő államot.

A legfontosabb Pennsylvania, 19 elektor.
Itt lőttek még Trumpot.
Ezt 2016-ban 0,7%-al nyerte Trump, 20-ban 1,2 %-al bukta, úgy, hogy 48,2%-ról, 48,8%-ra javított.

Most az utolsó 13 közvéleménykutatásokból csak 2 mondja hogy Harris nyeri, 7 Trumpot hozza győztesnek.
2016-ban 6%-al mértek felül a közvéleménykutatások Clintont a valós eredményhez képest, 20-ban 2%-al jobbat mutatták Bidennek a valós eredményhez képest.


Ezt be lehet húzni Trumpnak, 219+19=238 (270 kell)


Georgia. 16 elektor.
2106-ban 5÷%-al nyert Trump, 2020-ban 0,3%-al nyert Biden,
Az utolsó 10 közvéleménykutatásból egy sem mutat Harris vezetést. Ez sztem nem is billegő állam.



238+16=254 Trump elektor. (270 kell)


A harmadik legnagyobb billegő állam North -Carolina, szintén 16 elektor.
Ezt az államot mind 2016-ban, mind 2020-ban nyerte Trump, 3,6 / 1,5%-al.
A legutóbbi 11 kutatásból csak 2 mutat Harris előnyt.



Ez is Trump győzelem lesz és NC-vel meg is van a 270 elektor.
 

SilvioD

Well-Known Member
2018. december 23.
27 193
96 091
113
Nézzük azt tíz billegő államot.

A legfontosabb Pennsylvania, 19 elektor.
Itt lőttek még Trumpot.
Ezt 2016-ban 0,7%-al nyerte Trump, 20-ban 1,2 %-al bukta, úgy, hogy 48,2%-ról, 48,8%-ra javított.

Most az utolsó 13 közvéleménykutatásokból csak 2 mondja hogy Harris nyeri, 7 Trumpot hozza győztesnek.
2016-ban 6%-al mértek felül a közvéleménykutatások Clintont a valós eredményhez képest, 20-ban 2%-al jobbat mutatták Bidennek a valós eredményhez képest.


Ezt be lehet húzni Trumpnak, 219+19=238 (270 kell)


Georgia. 16 elektor.
2106-ban 5÷%-al nyert Trump, 2020-ban 0,3%-al nyert Biden,
Az utolsó 10 közvéleménykutatásból egy sem mutat Harris vezetést. Ez sztem nem is billegő állam.



238+16=254 Trump elektor. (270 kell)


A harmadik legnagyobb billegő állam North -Carolina, szintén 16 elektor.
Ezt az államot mind 2016-ban, mind 2020-ban nyerte Trump, 3,6 / 1,5%-al.
A legutóbbi 11 kutatásból csak 2 mutat Harris előnyt.



Ez is Trump győzelem lesz és NC-vel meg is van a 270 elektor.
Úgy hogy Arizonaban, +11 elektor, csak a CNN-nél vezet Harris.
 
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