Hú. Hát itt aztán nagyon (kvára) nagy problémák vannak/voltak 
Ilyen ordas hibákkal nem is csoda, hogy nem lehetett megmenteni.
Hogy lehet ilyen állapotban a tűo rdsz??? Befesteni a karokat, hogy mozdíthatatlan, nincs elég patron CO2 oltóhoz stb
+adalék, most olvastam, hogy a kárelhárítás kp-ját is érhette a találat. Az eddigi infók alapján, a RU flotta
legénysége, pedig nem képes és nincs felkészülve önállóan a kármentésre a hajó elszigetelt részein.
"All but one fire pump were located in the main engineering spaces" [rather than being distributed around the ship, as is Western practice].
"The hydrant fittings had been painted very sloppily and during a simulated fire, I observed that some of the handles were stuck. Stored fire equipment was not well maintained. Hoses were stained, fittings were corroded."
"The firefighting equipment was sparse and rudimentary. There was no distribution of firefighting and damage control equipment into Section bases. The DC crews all operated from a space adjacent to the main machinery control room."
"The main spaces were protected by a CO2 system, but ... there did not appear to be enough [bottles] to completely fill the main machinery spaces."
"There was a sprinkler system in the hangar and apparently in the missile and main gun magazines. There were no [emergency breathing devices] in the engineering spaces."
I'm told that the crew had only Chemox breathing sets - a 1950s solution now regarded as unsuitable for firefighting (US-made example shown here) - rather than modern self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Many hose handlers had no breathing protection at all.
Ilyen ordas hibákkal nem is csoda, hogy nem lehetett megmenteni.
Hogy lehet ilyen állapotban a tűo rdsz??? Befesteni a karokat, hogy mozdíthatatlan, nincs elég patron CO2 oltóhoz stb
+adalék, most olvastam, hogy a kárelhárítás kp-ját is érhette a találat. Az eddigi infók alapján, a RU flotta
legénysége, pedig nem képes és nincs felkészülve önállóan a kármentésre a hajó elszigetelt részein.
"All but one fire pump were located in the main engineering spaces" [rather than being distributed around the ship, as is Western practice].
"The hydrant fittings had been painted very sloppily and during a simulated fire, I observed that some of the handles were stuck. Stored fire equipment was not well maintained. Hoses were stained, fittings were corroded."
"The firefighting equipment was sparse and rudimentary. There was no distribution of firefighting and damage control equipment into Section bases. The DC crews all operated from a space adjacent to the main machinery control room."
"The main spaces were protected by a CO2 system, but ... there did not appear to be enough [bottles] to completely fill the main machinery spaces."
"There was a sprinkler system in the hangar and apparently in the missile and main gun magazines. There were no [emergency breathing devices] in the engineering spaces."
I'm told that the crew had only Chemox breathing sets - a 1950s solution now regarded as unsuitable for firefighting (US-made example shown here) - rather than modern self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Many hose handlers had no breathing protection at all.
