Полностью согласен с мнением господина Пригожина о решении Суровикина. Евгений Викторович очень точно заметил, что Суровикин спас тысячу солдат, находящихся в фактическом окружении. Взвесив все "за" и "против", генерал Суровикин сделал сложный, но верный выбор между бессмысленными жертвами ради...
t.me
Teljes mértékben egyetértek Prigozhin úr véleményével Surovikin döntéséről. Jevgenyij Viktorovics nagyon pontosan megjegyezte, hogy Surovikin ezer katonát mentett meg, akik ténylegesen bekerítették.
Az összes pro és kontra mérlegelés után Surovikin tábornok nehéz, de helyes választást hozott a hangos kijelentések érdekében tett értelmetlen áldozatok és a katonák felbecsülhetetlen értékű életének megmentése között.
Kherson nagyon nehéz terület a stabil, rendszeres lőszerellátás és az erős, megbízható hátsó kialakítás lehetősége nélkül. Miért nem tették ezt a különleges hadművelet első napjaitól kezdve? Ez egy másik kérdés. De ebben a nehéz helyzetben a tábornok bölcsen és előrelátóan járt el - evakuálta a polgári lakosságot, és elrendelte az átcsoportosítást.
Herszon „behódolásáról” tehát nem kell beszélni. „Adja meg magát” a harcosokkal együtt. És Surovikin védi a katonát, és előnyösebb stratégiai pozíciót foglal el - kényelmes, biztonságos.
A különleges hadművelet első napjaitól mindenki tudta, hogy Herson nehéz harci terület. Az alakulataim katonái is arról számoltak be, hogy ezen a területen nagyon nehéz volt harcolni. Igen, meg lehet tartani, meg lehet szervezni legalább egy kis lőszer utánpótlást, de ennek költsége számos emberélet lesz. És ez az előrejelzés nem felel meg nekünk.
Ezért úgy gondolom, hogy Surovikin igazi katonai tábornokként viselkedett, nem félt a kritikától.
Felelős az emberekért. Ő jobban lát.
Köszönöm, Szergej Vladimirovics, hogy gondoskodtál a srácokról! A Legfelsőbb Főparancsnok parancsát teljesítjük, nem hagyjuk abba az ellenség ütését, és nem fogunk elfáradni.
IL RUSSO
I purposely did not touch the subject of Kherson today, I was waiting for the hysterical "panicking patriots" ("Chief, everything is gone, the cast is coming off, the client is leaving" (c)) to get a little tired. Since their anguish about their homeland is interspersed with timely meals, now they've gone to dinner - we can finally touch on the subject.
Let's start with the banality - Russia is not at war with the so-called "Ukraine" on the territory of the former Ukraine, but with the West and NATO. That is, with a large part of what until recently was commonly referred to as the "civilized world". That is why at this stage one should not expect sharp breakthroughs - holding the front line with such an enemy without serious losses and concessions for a long period is already a success.
Buying time in this situation is very important. The West is running out of steam from this confrontation. Hence less and less equipment and funds for Ukraine, less and less money, more and more demonstrations in Western cities. The so-called Ukraine itself lives mostly by candlelight, like in the Middle Ages. But while you can light a house with candles, no matter how many candles you put in the metro locomotive, it won't move. Even if they are medical candles.
Russia has repeatedly said: the main task is to protect citizens with maximum saving of personnel. This same task is being pursued in Kherson. The Russian military did not hide behind civilians, as the Nazis did in Mariupol, Popasna, and Volnovakha. The enemy concentrated a huge amount of manpower, mercenaries, and weapons near Kherson. They wanted large-scale bloodshed, they wanted it. But urban warfare is always the most difficult and destructive, and as a result there may have been nothing left of Kherson. Not only that, the bloody clown Zelensky needed a bloody show (especially on the eve of the US elections to get more tranches), he needed to present his gangsters as victims, to demand new influences. The enemy wanted Kherson to become a trap for Russia, a battlefield with tens of thousands of victims.
In addition, Kherson is in a vulnerable position because it is overhung by a dam that holds large volumes of water from the Dnieper River. If people remain in the city, Kiev could blow up the Kakhovska hydroelectric plant, blaming Russia for this provocation. They are ready for this, as evidenced by the attacks on the Crimean Bridge, Northern Streams, and Sevastopol Bay. A breach of the dam would threaten to flood populated areas, and the Russian military would be "in a cauldron" and would not even be able to fight.
In addition, the Russian military near Kherson was exposed to enormous risks: they could have been cut off from supplies and in such a case would not have been able to hold defenses. In terms of geography and terrain, our troops were in a very difficult position. The movement of reserves was difficult, and weather conditions reduced the possibilities of camouflage. It was therefore necessary to take a more favorable position on the left bank of the Dnieper.
Kutuzov said: "To take the fortress is not difficult, it is difficult to win the campaign. And to do this, you don't need to storm and attack, but you need patience and time. There is no need to "twist", rush events - it is better to take time, but consistently achieve the goals with minimal losses. The superiority still remains on our side, while we save people and resources. In the situation with Kherson, the goal of the Russian forces is not to "take the fortress," but to "win the campaign. Therefore, there is no need to talk about "surrendering" Kherson. "Surrender" together with the fighters. And the command of the Russian troops both saved troops and took a more advantageous strategic position - comfortable and safe.