Rustem Umerov is taking over as Zelensky removes former defense minister Reznikov amid graft controversies.
www.wsj.com
Penteken talalkozott Sullivan az ukran antikorrupcios hivatalnokokkal - es vasarnapra Z levaltotta sajat regi konyvelojet is... pedig milyen jo kiallasu nemgoj bacsika.
(j/k)
Sok valtozast nem fog okozni a harcmezon amugy, a miniszter gyakorlatilag kizarolag nyugati lejmolassal foglalkozott, meg ugye a zsiros beszerzesekkel, amelyek korul nagyon durva botranyok tortek ki:
The former minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, a lawyer by training, was heavily involved in lobbying Ukraine’s Western partners for more military supplies, and is credited with helping ensure that the country received ever more sophisticated weapons systems as it stopped the Russian invasion and began to regain lost land.
Zelensky, in a message released Sunday night, didn’t offer a reason for Reznikov’s dismissal. “I believe that the ministry needs new approaches and other formats of interaction with both the military and the society at large,” he said.
The defense ministry was implicated in heavily publicized controversies in recent months as Ukrainian media discovered that officials were purchasing food and, later, winter uniforms at inflated prices. No evidence has been made available that Reznikov was involved in any corrupt activities, or that any Western military supplies were diverted.
The Ukrainian military was also rocked by corruption scandals at the regional recruitment offices, where several senior executives have been detained on charges of running rackets that allowed men to avoid mobilization and service on the front line by paying bribes. With losses mounting on the Zaporizhzhia front, corruption in mobilization matters has become a highly charged political issue.
Oleksiy Reznikov lobbied Ukraine’s Western partners for military supplies, and is credited with helping to ensure that the country received ever more sophisticated weapons systems. Photo: GLEB GARANICH/REUTERS
Western critics of military aid to Ukraine have seized on allegations of corruption as a reason to cut that vital assistance, increasing pressure on the Zelensky administration to show that it is serious about tackling graft.
On Friday, President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, met with leaders of Ukraine’s anticorruption institutions, underscoring the importance of independent and impartial investigation, prosecution and adjudication of “corruption cases no matter where they lead,” according to a White House statement.
Ukrainian defense ministers, particularly in wartime, don’t have anywhere near the authority of a U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Reznikov’s replacement is unlikely to lead to material changes on the battlefield.
The commander-in-chief of Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, oversees the campaign, while overall strategy is determined at frequent meetings of the Stavka, the high headquarters that is headed by Zelensky and includes both the military and the civilian leadership.
The Ukrainian defense minister’s role in the past 18 months focused above all on procurement matters, one of the reasons Reznikov was spending a large amount of time traveling to meetings and conferences abroad.
Ir meg boven az uj tatarrol stb.
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Allies must ramp up weapons production to give Kyiv the means to overpower Moscow once and for all
www.ft.com
Megvan a legujabb elmelet: Ukrajna nem gyozhet most - de majd 2025-ben igen, HA a Nyugat felporgeti a fegyvergyartast, amit ingyen ad nekik!
(Katonat meg 2024 oszetol rajzolnak hozza, gondolom...?)
Opinion Ukraine military briefing
Ukraine cannot win against Russia now, but victory by 2025 is possible
Allies must ramp up weapons production to give Kyiv the means to overpower Moscow once and for all
Richard Barrons
Ukrainian soldiers stand around in woodland Kyiv is constrained by the western bar on use of its equipment and munitions in Russia itself © Viacheslav Ratynskyi/Reuters
Richard Barrons YESTERDAY
The writer is a former general in the British Army and was previously commander of Joint Forces Command
Ukraine’s current counteroffensive will not throw Russia out — not that anyone expected it to. Nor is it likely to cut the occupation in half before the winter, which might have been one of the more optimistic aims. It has, however, shown how the Russian army can be beaten. Not in 2023, but in 2024 or 2025. Thus the refrain among western allies of supporting Kyiv “for as long as it takes”.
The modest progress achieved this summer shows that, while overcoming a well-prepared conventional battlefield defence may be one of the hardest operations in war, it can be done. The Ukrainian military has only breached the first line of trenches to take Robotyne in the south, having battled for weeks through minefields to get there. Progress is about eight miles with another 55 miles to go (through three lines of defences) before reaching the sea. The aim is to cut the land bridge to Crimea. To the north and south of Bakhmut, advances amount to about five miles with 10 miles to the Russian main defensive line and 60 miles to the border.
Ezutan leirja, hogy ugyan az oroszok is nyuzottak stb, ettol meg nem lesz konnyu veluk, valamint hogy Ukrajna legvedelme max legterenek egyharmadat ellenorzi, a tuzersegi loszerek hianya ideiglenesen megoldodott az amerikaiktol kapott cluster ammoval, es 2024 kozepe elott nem lesz kepes ujjaepiteni a legierejet. Nincs eleg aknamentesito felszereles. Mindez leghamarabb jovo evre fog megoldodni.
A sietseg vegzetes lenne az ukran 10th Corps maradvanyaira nezve, akik Ukrajna megmaradt tartalekat kepviselik, ha sietseg miatt nekihajtanak es szetcsapnak oket az oroszok. Nagy haboruk, mint ez az 1000+ kilometeren zajlo, mindig nagy meretben es sajat tempoban zajlanak.
A szerzo - volt brit tabornok, egyesitett vezerkari parancsnok - ot kritikus lepest lat elore, ami az oroszok legyozesehez szukseges:
Eloszor is, Kijevnek nem szabad eroltetni a harcmezon elert gyozelmeket azelott, mielott meglenne a kepessege ilyesmire. Meg kell erosodniuk, az oroszokat meg kell gyengiteni, vagy ebbol allohaboru es dontetlen lesz.
Masodsorban folyamatos nyomas alatt kell tartani a tel folyaman az orosz megszallo eroket. Tartsak fenn a "harapj ki es tartsd meg" muveleteket, rovid tavolsagra, tuzersegi es legvedelmi ernyo alatt maradva, ahol az utanpotlasok is biztosithatoak. Ezzel szepen le lehet daralni az orosz eroket, tartalekokat. Ha most is rossz a moral, akkor tegyek meg rosszabba.
Third, Ukraine must systemically weaken Russia’s military grip on its territories into 2024 and beyond. Smashing the artillery arm is important, and so too are attacks on deeper targets across occupied Ukraine. The objective is to destroy Russian military capability faster than it can be replaced, rendering it unable to withstand a stronger future Ukrainian offensive. Kyiv is constrained by the western bar on use of its equipment and munitions in Russia itself — but it must still apply its own ingenuity and courage to strike hard beyond its borders.
Fourth, the Russian Black Sea Fleet must be neutralised as an engine for Moscow’s devastating cruise missile strikes and a key constraint on the export of grain. Ukraine’s own missile strikes and rapidly expanding maritime drone capability can damage Russian ships faster than they are replaced. By spring 2024, the Black Sea Fleet should be playing no major part in this war.
Az otodik es egyben legfontosabb: fogadjak el, hogy ez a haboru a nyugati es ukran vedelmi gyartokapacitasokon fog eldolni, mint a katonai sikerek meghatarozo faktora. Sok jjohet meg tartalekokbol, de az ukran kampany a nyugati szovetsegesek gyartokapacitasainak felfuttatasatol fugg. Loszer az ujonnan epulo gyarakbol leghamarabb 2024 kozepen erkezhet; ezutan johet fordulopont Kijev offenziv kepessegeiben.