Amit írtál helyből baromság volt, már az első olvasatban is, hiába költöttél mellé gyorsan egy még ostobább ideológiát.
Olvasd már végig azt a cikket, amit idézel, bökjed meg! Ajánlom a Key Findings részt a figyelmedbe.
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Ez egy doktori a témában.
"Russia, however, fears a global system due to the number of interceptors that would hypothetically be possible. Tsypkin’s analysis provides some insight into this: “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the ten interceptors would present no threat to Russia, but that the Kremlin was concerned about the probability of a future global US BMD system with ‘hundreds or even thousands’ of interceptors not limited by any guarantee on the part of the US." This quotation referred to the ten interceptors being placed in Poland as part of the NATO missile defense architecture envisaged during the George W. Bush administration. "........
" Russia has its own concerns regarding Alliance missile defense just as NATO has its own concerns. Russia sees the system as a threat to its own strategic deterrent, while NATO is concerned with keeping up with current threats. One argument that has surfaced is that the United States cancellation of Phase 4 of the EPAA was meant to settle some of Russia’s fears regarding threats to its strategic deterrence. Technical analyses show, however, that the missiles that would have been deployed during this phase would have resulted in the tail chase of a Russian ICBM. Therefore, Russia’s concerns were unfounded.
The other argument is that Phase 4 was canceled due to a reprioritization of the budget. This reprioritization was justified based on reassessments of the 2010 BMDR. In March2013, the United States found that Iranian missile threats were not developing as quickly as was originally anticipated and therefore the money that had been set aside for that phase could be better used elsewhere—namely, defense against North Korean missiles.
The other large debate is whether NATO and Russia could eventually come to a consensus on how to work together towards cooperative missile defense. ..........
A step towards this would require the reinitiating of talks, with both sides coming to the table with a willingness to work together. This does not seem to be a plausible option until after the next Presidential election in Russia—if then. President Putin appears to be using his concerns about Alliance missile defense as an advantage for his campaign. By playing on the fears that have remained present in Russia since the Cold War, he is able to use the fears of a missile attack or a threat to Russia’s own strategic deterrence systems as an advantage to his campaign. He presents himself as the protector of Russia who must be reelected. Overall, it appears that the original objectives of the EPAA were modified as a result of many factors and not purely as the result of a specific interaction between Russia and NATO or Moscow and Washington. "
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