The First Period: June 1941–November 1942
By 1941, the Soviets had opted for the strategic defensive—a concept strongly repudiated when Svechin had argued in its favor ten years before. 10 The initial defense would be conducted by a first strategic echelon of 171 rifle divisions, though most of them were understrength. A covering force of 57 divisions was deployed within 100 km (60 miles) or so of the new western frontier; thinly spread (with up to 70 km [45 miles] per division), this first operational echelon could be expected to do little more than determine the enemy’s choice of axes while inflicting a slight delay and loss of momentum. The 114 divisions of the second operational echelon and reserves, with most of the 20 mechanized corps in the west, were deployed in depth as far back as the rivers Dnepr and Western Dvina (up to 600 km [370 miles] from the border). These formations, organized into three fronts and a separate army (later a front), were supposed to wear down, disrupt, and halt the enemy offensive forward of the Dnepr and initiate the counteroffensive that would drive him out of the country. The decisive element in this counteroffensive would be the second strategic echelon of five armies. This, however, was still completing its deployment two weeks into the war, when the enemy was already on or over the stop line. The concept was plausible in theory and flawed in practice. The posture of the Red Army was ill-suited to withstanding a full-blooded invasion. Received wisdom was that the enemy would be able to mount an initial assault with only a limited grouping, his covering armies, while the main force mobilized and deployed. This vision of the initial period of war was demonstrably outdated by 1941, but it still influenced the Soviets’ deployment and state of preparedness. 11 The army was maldeployed, with the main weight (especially mobile forces) in Ukraine rather than facing what would be the Germans’ actual main effort on the Moscow and Leningrad axes. Logistic preparations, with dumps well forward, were made in expectation of an early transition to the offensive. The initial period of the Great Patriotic War cruelly exposed the unrealistic expectations and deficiencies of the Red Army, from leadership through doctrine and organization, equipment and training to deployment. The army discovered that it had disastrously underestimated the possibility of the enemy not only achieving strategic and operational surprise but also invading with forces fully mobilized from the outset. 12 And even allowing for the Red Army being in the throes of reorganization, reequipment, and redeployment, it was not at a high level of readiness. The Germans immediately grasped the initiative and imposed their style of war on the USSR. With 152 experienced, fullstrength divisions, including 34 panzer and motorized divisions (not to mention 14 Finnish and 14 small Romanian divisions), they were able to achieve operational superiority on each of their chosen axes and exploit their advantages to the full.
A forrás ismét C. J. Dick, From Defeat to Victory, The Eastern Front, Summer 1944
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