Ez tény. Ahogyan az is amit én írtam az ilyen helikopteres páncélvadászokról.
A Shturmos Mi-24-es és az AH-64+Hellfire volt a két olyan heli ami ért is volna valamit. De ez már a HH vége.
Addig valós harci tapasztalatok alapján nem sokat értek a huzalos raksis helik.
Csak érdekességként, hogy amikor 1976-ban elkezdődött a huzalos HOT karrierje, akkor kezdődött a rádiófrekis Shturm karrierje az oroszoknál.
A HOT bitang erős pct. rakéta, de helikopterre nem szerencsés választás, a huzal miatt.
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Emlékezzünk azért élesebben, volt pozitiv példa is több. Érdekes az izraeli-sziriai esemény is:
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"Lebanon 1982 – Armed helicopters in battle
A currently forgotten and relatively unknown conflict took place in 1982 when Israeli forces crossed the border of its neighbour Lebanon in order to intervene in the civil war there. Within Lebanon Syrian forces had been present for some time, and these were also attacked in the same action. For the Israeli Army the principal task was to force the Syrian Army out. In previous wars the Israeli armed forces had generally been shown to be superior to the Syrian Army, and the latter found itself from the outset to be outnumbered.
However Syria had decided to develop its ability to fight against the renowned Israeli armoured forces, and the subsequent battles were extremely hard fought. As both sides have released official casualty figures that differ, and both have obviously toned down their own losses, and over-estimated those of the enemy, exact figures cannot be determined. The Israeli Air Force succeeded in gaining control of the air, which gave them a decisive advantage.
One of the most effective weapons was Syria’s armed helicopters. The country had access to Soviet Mi-25 attack helicopters, an inferior version of the well-known Mi-24, along with a number of type SA.342 Gazelle light helicopters equipped with armour-piercing missiles. Their 18 Gazelles were however armed with HOT missiles, just like the Bo 105 PAH-1. While the battle raged the Syrian helicopters carried out several surprise attacks against Israeli armour. The helicopters utilized terrain for cover while they were flying very low, between hills and clumps of trees. Two Gazelles were shot down by Israeli forces, two were forced to land and captured, and another one was damaged but managed to get back to Syria.
The amount of damage caused by the Syrian helicopters is not clear. Syria claims that the, among other things, their helicopters incapacitated 71 Israeli tanks and over 150 other vehicles. This is probably and overestimate and a more neutral assessment is that the Gazelle helicopters hit 30 tanks and about 50 other vehicles. Comparing the information from both sides, it is clear that the Syrian Air Force Gazelle helicopters were certainly effective and inflicted losses far beyond their limited numbers. The Israelis found it was very difficult to detect the helicopters and even after they had succeeded in acquiring air superiority the Syrian anti-armour helicopters were able to continue their attacks. In many cases the helicopters were not detected before they opened fire.
Israeli anti-aircraft vehicles were stationed well in front in order to be better able to repel attacks. The Israeli forces mistakenly shot down their own MD 500 Defender armed helicopters identified wrongly as Gazelles. One of the two Gazelles that were destroyed was shot down by an AH-1 Cobra helicopter armed with a TOW missile, and the other by an Israeli tank with its 105mm canon!
After the war, the Israelis repaired one of the Gazelles they had captured and tested it against their MD 500 Defender.
In all, Syria lost five Gazelle helicopters and in turn at least 80 or so Israeli tanks and other vehicles were knocked out. The Israeli MD 500 Defender helicopters were also successful but because the Gazelle helicopters were forced to face a well-equipped and numerically superior enemy that in addition ruled the air, their efforts were even more spectacular and show what a small force of anti-armour helicopters can achieve even when their opponent has air superiority. Also despite their lack of armour protection the Gazelles managed surprisingly well.
So on the whole it showed that light but fast anti-armour helicopters can be very effective. In addition the Israelis found that the psychological effect of the threat from the Syrian Gazelle helicopters on the Israeli forces was an even greater problem than the losses they caused."