Az említett tanulmányból google translate segítségével kiemeltem a Szíriára, Líbiára és Hegyi-Karabahra vonatkozó részeket.
Ezek csak általános információt tartalmaznak.
War in Syria:
The experience of the combat use of the Russian Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system, which is in service with the Syrian troops, against the Turkish BayraktarTB2 and Anka UAVs in 2017-2019, is presented in [125, 126]. In [125], an analysis of the “duel” confrontation between the air defense missile systems was carried out. Pantsir-S1 "and Turkish UAV Bayraktar TB2 and UAV Anka. It is indicated that the Bayraktar TB2 is an attack UAV carrying up to 4 guided UMTAS anti-tank missiles, which can hit targets at a distance of up to 8 km. For visual control, this UAV is equipped with either an OES equipped with IR sensors, several cameras and a laser range-meter, or a radar with an active phased array (AESA) with radar aperture synthesis. RCS of this UAV is presumably 0.01-0.1m
The combat use of the Bayraktar TB2 UAV involves the performance of two main types of missions: reconnaissance and strike. When performing a reconnaissance task, the UAV is flying at an altitude of about 6 km. In this case, the Pantsirya-S1 radar will be able to detect this UAV at a horizontal distance of at least 7 km. In the most successful combination of circumstances, at a distance of up to 15.3 km. The range at which the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system will be detected by the Bayraktar TB2 UAV OES depends on various parameters: the degree of illumination, atmospheric interference, the use of camouflage, the OES camera configuration, etc. As the Bayraktar TB2 OES UAV, the American military module Wescam is used CMX-15D. The cameras of this OES allow detecting a tank-type target, according to some sources, at a distance of up to 80 km. At a distance of 20 km, the resolution of this ECO allows viewing in the driver's cabin. Obviously, the OES of the Bayraktar TB2 UAV significantly exceeds the detection capabilities of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system, and therefore the UAV can reveal the fact that the air defense missile defense system is outside the radius of destruction of its missiles. OES Wescam CMX-15D is also equipped with laser rangefinders with a range of up to 20 km. Thus, from a range of 20 km, that is, at a range comparable to the range of the ZRPK detection means, the UAV has the ability to accurately determine its location and issue target designation to it for the use of striking means. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the OES UAV depends on atmospheric factors, the level of concealment of the air defense missile system and other factors, but in general, it is very likely that the UAV will reveal the location of the air defense missile system first and seize the initiative in the conduct of the confrontation. The further scenario of UAV actions involves a maneuver to enter the zone of destruction of an air defense missile system, an operational approach at a distance of up to 8 km (range of UMTAS missile launchers), launching missiles at an air defense missile system, performing a return maneuver. group, and their actions will be supported by the EW complexes KORAL and REDET EW. The impact of interference will lead to a decrease in both the detection range of the UAV from the radar of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system, and to a decrease in the probability of correct targeting of the missile defense system. This, in general, will reduce the likelihood of hitting the UAV at the time of its entry into the zone of destruction of the air defense missile system and the launch of missiles. The experience of the combat use of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system in Libya showed that the Pan-Tsir-S1 air defense missile system, due to certain design flaws in the radar, under jamming conditions provides a high probability of hitting a UAV exclusively at relatively short ranges - about 4 -6 km [125].
If we consider the case when a Bayraktar TB2 UAV is equipped with a radar instead of an OES, then the UAV gets a number of advantages. So mini-radar with AESA "Picosar" on the UAV Bayraktar TB2 provides scanning of the terrain with a resolution of 1m at a distance of 20km. At a range of 14 km, this radar provides a resolution of 0.3 m, which will allow the UAV to guarantee the location of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system and provide target designation to its guided missiles [125].
Considering the issue of confrontation between the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system and the Anka UAV, we note the following. The Anka UAV, in comparison with the Bayraktar TB2 UAV, has a lower RCS, a more effective AESA-based radar, a higher flight altitude (up to 12 km) and the ability to use Jdam air bombs with a launch range of 28 km and cruise missiles with a launch range of up to 250 km. Such performance characteristics allow the Anka UAV to successfully engage the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system without entering the area of action of its detection and destruction means [125].
The paper [126] analyzes the impact on the effectiveness of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system of the crew's coordination and efficiency, as well as the combat effectiveness of this air defense missile system under the conditions of group use of UAVs in real combat conditions. It is shown that, in general, the advantage is in the affected area, in the "duel" confrontation between the "Pantsir-S1" air defense missile system and the Bayraktar TB2 UAV, on the "Pantsir-S1" side. However, this advantage can be realized only if the air defense missile system is on alert, its radar successfully revealed the fact of the UAV's flight, took it for escort, and is ready to issue a target indication of the missile defense system when the UAV enters the affected area. However, in the practice of hostilities, a situation often arises when an air defense missile system at the time of its detection by a UAV is either "on the march", or one air defense missile system is attacked by several attack UAVs. In these cases, the role of the human factor sharply increases - the ability of the combat crew of air defense missile systems to respond promptly and adequately to the emerging situation. The standard time for the combat deployment of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system is 4.5 minutes, but in real combat conditions it can be much longer. Often, this time is quite enough for the Bayraktar TB2 UAV to enter the zone of destruction of the air defense missile system (18 km) and to launch its missiles (UMTAS missiles with a range of 8 km). Another problematic factor that reduces the combat effectiveness of air defense systems is that the average number of UAVs simultaneously attacking MANPADS in real combat conditions is three or more, and the UAVs attack MANPADS simultaneously from different directions. In the above conditions, the crew of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system, according to the experience of hostilities in Libya and Syria, either consumed all the ammunition (12 missiles) when the "head" UAVs of the first strike echelon appeared, while the UAVs of the second echelon successfully used their missiles. you on MANPADS, or ZRPK "Pantsir-S1" simply was not deployed in a combat position [126].
As a result of the military confrontation in Syria, Turkey has taken the tactics of using its UAVs to a new level. Firstly, attack UAVs began to be used on an ongoing basis against the personnel and weapons of the regular army - the Armed Forces of Syria, and not against irregular military formations. Secondly, tactics were developed for the use of Bayraktar TB2 strike UAVs massively, in groups, under the cover of heavier Anka reconnaissance UAVs, equipped with radar, OER and EW complexes, as part of solving the tasks of defeating air defense missile systems and air defense missile defense systems. According to the Turkish mass media (media), the means of the electronic warfare stationed on the Anka UAV almost always succeeded in successfully suppressing the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system radar, which allowed the Bayraktar TB2 attack UAVs to enter the affected area of these air defense missile systems and successfully attack them [ 289].
According to unconfirmed reports, according to media reports of the opposing sides, during the military operation of Turkish troops in Syria in the period from September 2019. to September 2020 In duel situations "UAV-ZRPK" about 20 UAVs Bayraktar TB2 and Anka were destroyed, while 8 ZRPK "Pantsir-S1" were lost. However, it can be assumed that these data were overestimated for propaganda purposes. According to official reports, as well as confirmed data, during this period 10 Bayraktar TB2 and Anka UAVs were shot down and 2 Pantsir-S1 air defense missile systems were lost [294, 295]. At the same time, even if we focus on officially exposed losses, the exchange of 1 air defense missile system "Pantsir-S1" on 5 UAVs confirms the inadequately low level of combat survivability of air defense missile systems, in conditions of massive use of UAVs. Thus, it can be stated that groups of attack UAVs from the target of the air defense missile system, on the contrary, become effective means of opening and destroying the enemy air defense system. [289]. In the future, tactical techniques for the use of UAVs were developed during their combat use in Libya and in Nagorno-Karabakh.
