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molnibalage
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Van neki saját FB oldala?Tom Cooper nagyon aktuális és ideillő, ma délelőtti FB posztja - a szerző engedélyével:
Topic is: Soviet Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs).
Understanding these, one needs to understand the Soviet Way of Fighting Wars: i.e. why did the Soviets develop what weapon system and how was this supposed to be used. That, plus the stand of local technology at the given point in time is then explaining why specific weapon systems came into being. Indeed: it's explaining even why they looked the way they did.
Principal issue in regards of 'how were they meant to be used' was that of 'for what kind of targets were the Soviets developing missiles in question?'.
Starting point in regards of the Soviet AAM-research was 'defence of the Rodina', i.e. defence of the Soviet airspace. Back in the late 1940s and then through most of the 1950s, this was regularly penetrated by all sorts of high-flying US and British reconnaissance aircraft (Canberras and RB-57s, and then U-2, but also RB-47s).
Available interceptors (MiG-15bis, followed by MiG-17F and then MiG-19S and Mig-19P) all proved hopelessly unable to even catch these, not to talk about intercepting and shooting them down.
Moreover, the Soviets knew that meanwhile the USA, UK and France were developing even more advanced, ever higher-flying- and faster bombers (see the V-bombers, B-58, Mirage IV, XB-70 etc.). Worst of all: an increasing number of these bombers were equipped with at least 'stand-off' if no 'cruise missiles'. I.e. the situation was about to become really dangerous for the USSR.
Conclusions were on hand: the V-PVO (Soviet air defence force) had to be equipped with a radar network capable of early detecting any kind of intruders, and then with interceptors capable of not only catching, but actually destroying these, too. Indeed, due to the sheer size of the USSR, these intruders also had to be caught early, i.e. quickly, and then promptly destroyed - or 'killed with the first blow'. As a result, the interceptors had to fly ever faster and higher, and be armed with big AAMs, capable of taking out any target with a single blow.
With other words: nobody there thought about 'dogfights'. Even when such early Soviet AAMs like RS-2U and R-3S were under development, in the 1950s, primary targets were such like B-47, B-52, Canberra and/or R/B-57, U-2s and similar stuff, and prospective targets such like B-58, Vulcan, Victor, Mirage IV etc....
This didn't change by much once the GenStab ordered the development of a new fighter-interceptor, in 1962. Actually, it only got 'worse': the widespread deployment of the Soviet S-75 (SA-2 Guideline) SAM-system has forced Western strategists into switching their modus operandy to low-altitude operations. And the NATO then started purchasing 'thousands' of F-104Gs.
Thus, henceforth, primary targets for Soviet interceptors became 'thousands' of low-flying tactical fighters armed with nukes - like F-101s, F-104G and F-105s. In such a scenario, there was simply no margin for error: ALL of these had to be killed, preferably with the first blow and well before reaching theirtargets.
...and the available technology and know-how were not up to the task, which is why the Soviets so happily jumped at the opportunity to copy the AIM-9B (i.e. reverse engineer it into the R-3S).
From the Soviet POV, there was no obvious need to change anything about this even once the 'early' experiences from Vietnam and the Middle East became known. Why do so, if these experiences were, from their point of view, non-relevant for them? After all, their primary targets were no 'dogfighting' Mirage IIICs, but nuke-armed F-104s, F-105s, and then - in the early 1960s - F-111s, none of which were 'dogfighters'.
Besides, why 'waste time' (and fuel) with 'combat air patrols' and/or 'dogfights' - if one can kill the opponent with that 'first blow'? Vector your interceptor along the ideal interceptor course, let it acquire and kill.
One could say: the Soviet military theoreticians (all were officers working for the GenStab) brought the essence of air warfare to its lowest common denominator. No need for any 'nice to have things', no need for expensive, complex, maintenance-intensive avionics installed into interceptors, no need for wasting time - if you kill your enemy that way.
It was only once it became clear that what was available (the MiG-21/R-3S combo), or about to become available (MiG-23/R-23 combo) was still unlikely to be 'enough', that the things started to change. This conclusion 'definitely hit home' only during the Op Linebacker II, in December 1972, when MiG-21s proved unable to intercept and shot down 'even' B-52s. That was what eventually prompted the development of the types like MiG-29 and Su-27, armed with a new AAM, R-27 - which was supposed to offer the 'kill with the first blow' capability even against heavier and/or better-protected targets (than B-52s).
...and while they were at that, the Soviets then had to make both of them capable of fighting the latest generation of Western 'superfighters' (as F-14, F-15 etc. were named back then, in the 1970s and 1980s).
Now, why both the SARH and the IRH variants of the R-27?
It was the same design philosophy like in the case of earlier K-8, R-4, R-23 and R-40: this wasn't that much related to possible 'countermeasures', as much as to the equipment of Soviet interceptors. The Soviets couldn't afford 'installing a computer into every interceptor', nor saw a necessity to do so. They installed a computer into the (ground based) interceptor control. This was integrating all the available intel on the enemy, plus early warning radar picture, plus intel collected by ESM-systems etc., and providing the interceptor with all the targeting information necessary. Thus, the interceptors also only carried the equipment necessary to fulfill their task. The result were types like MiG-23, which had a ('primitive', at least from Western POV) 'look-down/shoot-down' capability, but only from the front hemisphere.
This was why they were armed with semi-active radar homing AAMs for.
And, since their radars couldn't detect and track targets from the rear hemisphere, they've got an infra-red-search and track system, and IRH AAMs for attacks from that aspect.
Meanwhile, the 'problem' of having a host of interceptors that lacked the 'second attack capability' - alone due to the fact that they were so poorly manoeuvreable that they couldn't even quickly turn around to re-attack - prompted the Soviets into developing such AAMs like R-13M and R-60. When these proved insufficient, they went for the R-73. These were meant to enable 'even' such types like MiG-23 and MiG-25 to target 'dog-fighters'.
(Moreover, the MiG-23 was meanwhile further developed so to at least get close to the manoeuvreability of such types like F-14 and F-15, but that's a different story.)
Overall, the Soviets thought about research and development of AAMs entirely differently than the Westerners - and, to really understand them, one has to put him/herself into their pair of shoes. What is certainly wrong to do when studying this topic, is to gauge them by the way we in the West tend to think.
Az AVR = automatizát rávezetési rendszer. Ezek közül egy adott szinten levő a VOZDUH.Ez az AVR olyasmi mi volt mint a VOZDUH-1M ?
A Haditechnikai összefoglalóban külön fejezet van neki és mellékletben is van hozzá anyag.
https://htka.hu/2017/12/20/haditechnikai-osszefoglalo-2017-es-kiadas/
