When the first tank was hit, we knew that the nightmare had begun. You should understand that the first missile which hits is not the really dangerous missile. The ones which come afterward are the dangerous ones—and there always follow four or five after the first. . . . It was hellfire, and have no idea when it will get you. You just pray that it will end at last, that the volley will end and that you will hear on the radio that everybody is OK. But, unfortunately, that is not what we heard when the shooting ended, no sir!.”
Tank commanders were frantically calling for air and artillery support, but because of the large number of Nahal infantrymen present, Northern Command refrained from calling for assistance from artillery or helicopter gunships, fearing to hit friendly forces. The crews were disoriented by constant fire from all directions and poor visibility. View of killed and wounded comrades. The tanks were left to fend for themselves until they reached the top and stormed the Hezbollah anti-tank positions. When this was achieved, the brigade commander making his rounds, found to his surprise, that in all, only four crewmen were killed, but scores wounded, fortunately most of them suffering minor wounds. Two rather remarkable incidents happened in the heat of battle and are worth recounting: one Mk 4 tank was hit by a tandem missile which penetrated into the rear compartment, hitting a stored HEAT round setting it on fire, which activated the automatic fire suppression system, but wounding two of the turret crew, who were evacuated and replaced by a reserve crew and the tank continued to fight. Another tank had its main 120mm gun has been blown off by a "lucky" shot, but the crew managed to drive it back to the border, where a field ordnance repair team exchanged the barrel and sent the tank back into the battle within hours.
A recovery party of 46/401 was directed to the spot led by Cpt Bneya Rain, when his tank was destroyed by ATGM at Khirbat al Kasīf killing all the crew. At afternoon hours 52 battalion of the 401 brigade with 4 tanks, 2 D9 dozers and motor-infantry has been called to support and complete the mission. It moved through and opened the correct route but lost one tank to IED and reached the positions of 931 battalion by 3am August 13. 52 'V' CO recalled:
"We reached the tanks of 9th - the scene was very unpleasant. The tanks were scattered and the people exhausted. We moved in with D9 dozers opened the route and reached Ghandouriyeh and by this completed the mission of 9th"
Hezbollah fighters used ATGMs, small-arms fire, and mortars to suppress the Nahal Brigade, preventing them from providing effective infantry support for the armor forces. Only after all forces gained situational awareness on 12 August the IDF was able to synchronize its overwhelming firepower and take the high ground in Ghandouriyeh by the morning of August 13. All killed and wounded of 9th were recovered by 401 brigade recon company under heavy fire that later assisted for recovery of Nahal casualties from the villages. The medical aid was provided by Nahal brigade field medics under constant mortar fire. According to the witness account is was chaotic. "A lot of screaming but not much control. There was no established system and looked like the each medic acted on his own. The helicopters were called late and landing them was problematic."
This fight received very ferocious feedback in Israel and was used to accuse IDF high command in the tactical and strategic mistakes that led to loss of life and materials. It was called an apogee of IDF command mistakes and incompetence (and by some other names like "microcosm of war's mistakes" - Jerusalem Post, Aug 29, 2006). Lack of coordination between armor, infantry, close air support, and artillery left the armor force on its own. The intel failed to identify the main threat and most of the officers and commanders were not updated on the late mission plan changes. Furthermore this fight showed that the IDF lost many of these perishable combat skills during its long years of COIN operations against the Palestinians. The crews were not trained appropriately and lacked basic skills of full-scale war. Not a single tank crewman in all 24 tanks thought to deploy the tanks’ smoke grenades while they were being ambushed, further evidence of failing to train with their weapons. The officers stopped and assisted damaged tanks instead of leading the force though the mission critical point. In any case this fight was full of heroism and dedications and certainly was not a failure of the soldiers. Many of the tankmen develped so called "Saluki syndrom" - refusing to serve in the reserved armor units after the war.
Later summing up the fight of Saluki, Colonel Kidor (401 CO) said:
“It had been an unqualified triumph of Merkava Mk 4. Had those tanks been of an earlier generation, not equipped with state-of-the-art technology and active self-protection mechanisms, 50 crewmen might well have perished”. None of the tanks hit in Wadi Saluki was destroyed while at least two were badly damaged.
Despite all the criticism and accusations, the fight for Saluki has been proclaimed as success by IDF.
Special THANKS to Eli Greenberg for his personal comments and additional details.
Mert én biztos nem.
